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Sugar is one of the most policy distorted of all commodities, and the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States are among the worst offenders. However, internal changes in 
the E.U. and U.S. sugar and sweeteners markets and international trade commitments 
make change unavoidable and provide the best opportunity for policy reform in several 
decades. The nature of reforms can have very different consequences for developing 
countries. If existing polices in the E.U. and the U.S. are adjusted to accommodate higher 
imports under international commitments, many low-cost producers, such as Brazil, will 
lose because they do not currently have large quotas and are not included among the 
preference countries. The benefits of sugar policy reform are greatest under multilateral 
reform, and according to recent studies, the global welfare gains of removal of all trade 
protection are estimated to total as much as $4.7 billion a year. In countries with the 
highest protection (Japan, Western Europe, the U.S., Indonesia, and Eastern Europe) net 
imports would increase by an estimated 15 million tons a year, which would create 
employment for nearly one million workers in developing countries. World sugar prices 
would increase by as much as 40 percent, while sugar prices in countries that heavily 
protect their markets would decline. Developing countries that have preferential access to 
the E.U. or U.S. sugar markets are likely to lose some of these preferences as sugar 
policies change. However, the value of  preferential access is less than it appears, because 
many of these producers have high production costs and would not produce at world 
market prices.  
 
     3
Sugar Policies: Opportunity for Change 
 
Donald Mitchell 
The World Bank 
Executive Summary 
 
Sugar is one of the most policy distorted of all commodities, and the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States are among the worst offenders. Producers in these countries 
receive more than double the world market price due to government guaranteed prices, 
import controls, and production quotas. Such high protection has converted this group of 
OECD countries from net importers of half of the world’s internationally traded sugar to 
net exporters, in aggregate, over the past 30 years. In the process, lower-cost developing 
county producers have been deprived of export opportunities. Efforts to reduce protection 
have met with stiff opposition from well-funded and entrenched supporters of existing 
policies, while consumers who pay high prices have voiced little opposition because of 
the small share of their food budgets spent on sugar. However, internal changes in the 
E.U. and U.S. sugar and sweeteners markets and international trade commitments make 
change unavoidable and provide the best opportunity for policy reform in several 
decades. While pressures for change are less in Japan, it may be the right time to press for 
global reform of sugar policies focusing on the worst offenders. Such reforms could 
become a key component of negotiations on the part of developing countries during the 
current round of multilateral trade negotiations, and a broad-based reform effort could 
provide the political cover needed for countries to make difficult policy changes. 
  Protection is very high in the E.U., Japan, and the U.S., but many other countries 
also protect their sugar producers. Part of this protection has evolved as a defense against 
policies that subsidize exports and depress world prices, and part of it has evolved 
because the industry in these countries is uncompetitive but politically powerful. Among 
other OECD countries with high protection are Mexico, Poland and Turkey. Turkey, for 
example, has higher protection for its sugar producers than does the E.U., and this has led 
to rapid production increases and periodic large exports. Among developing countries, 
China has import restrictions that generally keep domestic prices higher than world 
market prices. India, the largest sugar producer, has a heavily regulated domestic sugar 
market and high import tariffs to protect local producers. Kenya has high tariffs and 
import quotas to protect domestic producers.  
Current protectionist policies have their origins in the 1800s when northern 
hemisphere countries that produced sugar from beets could not compete with lower-cost 
sugar produced from cane in tropical countries. The situation remains the same today, 
with the cost of sugar produced from beets nearly twice as costly as sugar produced from 
cane—even though refined (white) sugar from beet or cane is chemically identical and 
indistinguishable. The struggle for market share between beet and cane sugar producers 
has continued for 200 years, with the shares of global production following protectionist 
policies. In 1800, nearly all the world’s sugar was produced from cane. Then, in the early 
1800s commercial sugar beet production began in Europe, and by 1900 sugar beets 
accounted for 60 percent of the world’s production. Now, sugar beets account for only 27 
percent of global production, however, in the heavily protected E.U., Japanese, and U.S. 
markets, sugar beets still account for 83 percent of production.    4
  More than half of the value of sugar production in OECD countries comes from 
government support or transfers from consumers—an average of $6.4 billion per year 
during 1999-2001. This about equals the annual $6.3 billion of sugar exports of 
developing countries, and was more than half of the $11.6 billion annual world sugar 
trade. The E.U. provided the largest support to its sugar producers, with $2.7 billion  
average annual support during 1999-2001, while the U.S. provided the second-largest 
support with $1.3 billion annually. Japan provided $0.4 billion support, while Mexico, 
Turkey, and Poland, provided annual support of $0.7, $0.5, and $0.2 billion, respectively. 
Such high support typically limits consumption, through high prices to consumers, and 
encourages production even when a country does not have a comparative advantage in 
sugar production. It also distorts production of products which use sugar, such as 
confectionery and fruit juices, and production of sugar substituting products, such as 
high-fructose corn syrups. Products such as ethanol, which can be  produced from sugar 
cane or beets, are also affected by sugar policies and vice-versa.  
  Sugar policies in the E.U. and U.S. will face increasing internal pressures for 
reform as imports increase under international agreements. The E.U. has committed to 
allow the 48 least developed countries duty-free access to its sugar market by 2009 under 
its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. This could result in as much as an additional 
2.4 million tons of sugar imports according to recent estimates. These imports would 
need to be offset by about 17 percent lower production quotas or increased non-food uses 
such as ethanol production in order to comply with ACP/EU Sugar Protocol and WTO 
commitments. The E.U. began negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements with 77 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries in September 2002, and these 
Agreements could extend duty-free access to all ACP countries and allow an additional 6 
million tons of sugar to enter the E.U. The enlargement of the E.U., with 10 new 
members scheduled to join in 2004, could further add to pressures for reform by 
increasing production and exports of sugar. A WTO challenge to the E.U. sugar regime 
by Brazil, Australia, and Thailand could lead to even more rapid changes to the sugar 
program if successful. The U.S. also faces major challenges to its sugar program because 
domestic production is increasing faster than consumption, and international agreements 
will allow increasing imports. Mexico will be allowed unlimited duty-free access in 2009 
under NAFTA. This could lead to a surge in imports from Mexico and to building U.S. 
government stocks. Even before 2009, the over-quota tariff rate is scheduled to decline 
by 15 percent per year under NAFTA until it reaches zero in 2008, and this could lead to 
large imports in the next several years if world market sugar prices remain low. The free-
trade agreement between the United States and five central American countries currently 
being negotiated could allow these large sugar producing countries eventual access to the 
protected U.S. sugar market. Policy changes will be needed to the U.S. sugar program, 
and they could include substantially reduced production quotas, or sharply lower sugar 
prices. Japan faces less pressure for reform, but it provides higher protection to its sugar 
producers than either the E.U. or U.S. The timing of needed E.U. and U.S. sugar policy 
reforms coincides with the expiration of the current E.U. sugar policy in June 2006 and 
the expiring U.S. Farm Bill in 2007. This provides an opportunity for coordinated 
reforms between these two important sugar producers. 
The benefits of sugar policy reform are substantial, and the gains are greatest 
under multilateral reform. According to recent studies of the global sugar and sweetener   5
markets, the global welfare gains of removal of all trade protection are estimated to total 
as much as $4.7 billion per year. In countries with the highest protection (Japan, Western 
Europe, the U.S., Indonesia, and Eastern Europe) net imports would increase by an 
estimated 15 million tons per year which would create employment for nearly one million 
workers in developing countries. World sugar prices would increase by as much as 40 
percent, while sugar prices in countries which heavily protect their markets would 
decline. The greatest price decline would occur in Japan, where sugar prices would fall 
65 percent, followed by a 40 percent decline in Western Europe, and a 25 percent decline 
in the United States. Brazilian producers gain the most from liberalization, around $2.6 
billion per year, but this is offset by a loss of $1 billion to Brazilian consumers who pay 
higher prices after liberalization—leaving a net gain of $1.6 billion for Brazil. One 
general conclusion from recent studies is that protection in the world sugar market is 
imposed by developed countries at great cost to themselves and those developing 
countries with the economic potential to expand exports. 
A number of developing countries have preferential access to the E.U. or U.S. 
sugar markets through the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol or the U.S. sugar import program. 
These countries receive the high internal price on exports allowed by quotas and this 
preferential access is valued at about $0.8 billion per year when compared to world 
market prices. However, the value of this preferential access is less than it appears, 
because many of these producers have high production costs and would not produce at 
world market prices. Further, world market prices would rise by as much as 40 percent 
after full liberalization, which would partially offset the loss to producers of high prices 
in preferential markets. The net loss to these exporting countries from full liberalization is 
estimated to total $0.45 billion per year.  
  The benefits of sugar policy reform are substantial, but the nature of reforms can 
have very different consequences for developing countries. If existing polices in the E.U. 
and the U.S. are adjusted to accommodate higher imports from EBA, NAFTA and other 
policies, many low-cost producers, such as Brazil, will lose because they do not currently 
have large quotas and are not included in the EBA,  ACP, or NAFTA countries. A better 
alternative is to push for full liberalization of the world sugar market in order to allow 
efficient producers to expand production and exports, and allow consumers in protected 
markets to benefit from lower prices. This may also make policy change more palatable 
because no country is being singled out for reform. It has the advantage of somewhat 
higher world prices from coordinated liberalization to soften the adjustment for producers 
in protected markets. While change will not be easy, a coordinated liberalization has 
substantial advantages over marginal adjustments which keep existing sugar policies in 
place but allow larger imports.   6
I. Introduction  
 
Sugar is one of the most policy distorted of all commodities, with a history of protection 
dating back to at least the 1800s. Protection has been greatest in northern hemisphere 
countries that produce sugar beets, because sugar produced from beets is nearly twice as 
expensive as sugar produced from cane and most beet producers cannot survive without 
high protection. Such high protection has led to a number of problems, as producers and 
consumers respond to high prices, and firms adjust their operations to benefit from high 
prices or to evade high prices if they manufacture products which use sugar. One of the 
unwanted consequences of high protection is surplus sugar production which is then 
disposed of in the world market at subsidized prices. For example, the European Union 
has shifted from being a small net importer during the 1960s to a net exporter of 4 million 
tons of sugar per year (10 percent of world trade), and most of this has been exported 
with direct or indirect subsidies. An estimated 80 percent of sugar production and 60 
percent of world sugar trade occurs at higher than world market price. Many countries 
have been pressured to protect domestic producers from heavily subsidized exports and 
depressed world market prices. This cycle of protection, subsidies, and more protection 
has been occurring for decades. Efforts to reform sugar policies and stop the cycle of 
protection leading to more protection may finally pay off because the European Union 
and the United States—two of the worst offenders—now have internal pressures to 
reform sugar policies, which may prove more effective than external pressures.  
The European Union’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative approved in 2001 
allows immediate expanded access to the E.U. sugar market by the 48 least developed 
countries, and unlimited access by 2009. These imports will need to be offset by reducing 
production quotas or lowering internal prices. Further, the E.U. is scheduled to admit 10 
new countries in 2004, and many  of these countries are sugar beet producers. An 
additional three countries, also sugar beet producers, will join at a later time. Once these 
countries join, they are expected to increase production and exports. If consumption in 
these accession countries does not increase apace with production, E.U. intervention 
stocks could be forced to absorb the surplus. An additional longer-term threat to the E.U. 
sugar program is the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which the E.U. began 
negotiating with all 77 ACP countries in September 2002. Under these Agreements, the 
same access provided to the 48 least developed countries will likely be extended to all 77 
ACP countries. These countries currently produce 6 million tons of sugar and they could 
provide all of it to the E.U. on short notice while covering their own consumption from 
the world market. Combined EBA and EPA sugar imports could total more than half of 
current E.U. sugar production if fully implemented. An external pressure for reform of 
the E.U. sugar regime is a WTO complaint filed by Brazil, Australia, and Thailand on 
September 27, 2002, which charges that the E.U. sugar regime subsidizes exports beyond 
those allowed by WTO commitments. A finding against the E.U. could lead to an 
immediate reform of the sugar regime. 
The U.S. also needs to reform its sugar policy because high prices have 
encouraged high domestic beet and cane production as well as the emergence of sugar-
substituting high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS). Sugar and sweetener consumption is not 
growing fast enough to absorb such increases and minimum import commitments made 
under  NAFTA and WTO could soon begin to pile up. Mexico gains unlimited duty-free   7
access to the U.S. sugar market in 2009, and may also increase exports before 2009 under 
the declining above-quota NAFTA tariff if world market sugar prices remain low. This 
could lead to large imports, which would destabilize the sugar program and lead to 
sharply lower prices or production quotas. The free-trade agreement currently being 
negotiated between the United States and five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) could also add to imports since these 
countries produce more than 3 million tons of sugar per year, export 1.2 million tons, and 
only have quotas to sell 126,000 tons in the U.S. 
Japan faces less pressure for reform, but has the highest levels of  protection of 
the three countries and could be targeted as part of a renewed effort at global sugar policy 
reform. This paper looks at the pressures for policy reform in the E.U., Japan, and the 
U.S. and argues that prospects for reform are better now than for several decades The 
remainder of the paper begins with a brief history of sugar that helps to explain why 
sugar policies have evolved as they have and why reform has been so difficult. The third 
section gives essential background on sugar and sweeteners, cost of production, the world 
market, and support to OECD sugar producers. The fourth section examines sugar 
policies in major non-OECD sugar producers and traders to see how they would be 
affected by reforms. The fifth section reviews policies in the E.U., Japan, and the United 
States in detail and shows why internal reforms are necessary. The final section provides 
a summary and conclusion to the paper. Appendix tables provide historical data on global 
and country sugar consumption, exports, imports, and production.  
 
II.  A Brief History of Sugar 
 
Sugar was a very precious commodity when the first shipments of Caribbean cane sugar 
were sent to Europe during the early sixteenth century. Sugar was produced for centuries 
before that in China, India, the Mediterranean, and throughout Polynesia. The Persians 
discovered a chemical process for solidifying and refining sugar in the sixth or seventh 
century and this greatly facilitated trade (Strong 1954). The first record of Caribbean 
sugar being shipped to Europe was in 1516 when sugar was shipped to Spain. By 1530, 
12 ships were recorded as arriving in Spain with 1,500 tons of sugar (Hannah 2001). 
Sugar cane production quickly spread from the Caribbean islands south to Brazil, north to 
America, and around the world. The Dutch arrived in Java in 1596 and found a sugar 
industry operated by Chinese immigrants. They developed the industry and exported 
sugar to Persia and Japan during the early seventeenth century. The English began to 
grow sugar cane in Barbados in the early seventeenth century, and production expanded 
rapidly and displaced sugar cane production in other areas of the Caribbean and Americas 
(Harrison, 2001). By 1665, Barbados was exporting nearly 7,000 tons of sugar annually 
to England. The emergence of the beet sugar industry in Europe displaced sugar 
production in the Caribbean during the nineteenth century, but production recovered 
during the twentieth century. The long and colorful history of sugar, perhaps as much as 
anything, explains the current world sugar market, its policies, patterns of production, and 
trade.  
  The high demand for sugar, and the high cost of producing sugar in distant lands 
and transporting raw cane sugar back to Europe for refining and sale, led to the 
development of a competing sugar industry in Europe. This new industry was based on   8
sugar beets and the struggle between sugar beet and sugar cane producers began, and 
remains, at the root of sugar policy in Europe. The commercial production of sugar from 
beets began in the early 1800s and by 1815 sugar beet production was well established in 
Europe. Rebellion in the colonies during the late 1700s and early 1800s and the 
disruption of supplies encouraged European countries to establish their own sugar 
industries and many subsidized sugar beet production. Such subsidies still continue in the 
European Union as part of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
  European sugar beet producers had a comfortable cost of production advantage 
over sugar cane produced in the Caribbean because of the high transportation cost. 
Perhaps equally important was a favorable duty drawback system on raw cane sugar, 
began by France in 1684 and later extended to beet sugar by all major European beet 
producers (Hannah 2001). The system initially allowed cane sugar refiners to receive a 
drawback of the import duties on raw sugar when the refined sugar was exported. The 
system was extended to beet sugar exports in a way that allowed beet sugar to receive the 
drawback on domestic production and this allowed exports at less than the cost of 
production (perhaps the first sugar export subsidy). Cane sugar from the colonies could 
not compete with such subsidies and the industry went into decline. Between 1800 and 
1900, sugar beet production emerged and grew to 60 percent of the world’s sugar 
production and dominated trade. Opposition to the duty drawback system emerged and in 
1863 France, Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain met in a conference to discuss the 
problem. It took another 40 years for the duty drawback system to be ended by an 
agreement among all major European producers. The ending of the duty drawback 
system, declining transport costs, and lower sugar cane production costs meant that sugar 
beets would lose market share during the next century. By 2000, about 27 percent of 
world sugar production was from sugar beets, and nearly all of that was produced in 
protected markets in Europe, Japan, the United States, and in Eastern Europe. 
  The current sugar program in the European Union began in 1968, when sugar was 
first included in the Common Agricultural Policy. It has afforded E.U. sugar beet 
producers high and stable prices which have encouraged production, reduced 
consumption and imports, and contributed to making the E.U. the second-largest sugar 
net exporter after Brazil. The first U.S. government sugar program began in 1934 (Lord, 
1995, page 23) and continues in much the same form today—with high prices to 
producers and consumers, which have contributed to shrinking imports for foreign sugar 
cane exporters. Since the early 1970s, U.S. net sugar imports have declined from more 
than 5 million tons per year to slightly more than 1 million tons per year. Japan’s sugar 
program began with the Sugar Price Stabilization Law of 1965 (Fukuda, Dyck and Stout, 
2002), and it also provides high domestic support for its sugar beet and sugar cane 
producers. And, like the E.U. and the U.S., it has contributed to Japan’s decreasing sugar 
imports over the past two decades. Thus, the three largest markets for sugar imports in 
the 1970s have been mostly closed to competition and emerged as self-sufficient on 
balance compared to the early 1970s when their combined net imports accounted for half 




















  In much the same way that the European sugar beet industry emerged in the early 
1800s because of high priced Caribbean sugar, a competitor to sugar has emerged 
because of high domestic protection to sugar producers. The competitor is high-fructose 
corn syrup, which is a nearly perfect sugar substitute in uses such as soft drinks. Corn 
syrups now account for 40 percent of caloric sweeteners use in Japan, and more than half 
of U.S. caloric sweetener consumption. The technique for commercial production of 
high-fructose corn syrup was discovered in the late 1960s and was made profitable by 
high sugar prices in the protected Japanese and U.S. markets. But now, economies of 
scale, improvements in production techniques, and large installed production capacity 
(financed under high prices), have made corn syrups competitive with sugar from cane 
and less costly than sugar from beets.  
 
III.   Essential Background 
 
Sugar occurs naturally in most foods, but it is economically extracted from only a few 
crops such as sugar beets, sugar cane, and corn. The common sugar, which we are most 
familiar with, is sucrose. It is a disaccharide of dextrose and fructose with a chemical 
formula of C12H22O11. It is extracted in nearly pure form from sugar cane and sugar beets. 
Sucrose from sugar beets and sucrose from sugar cane are chemically identical and 
indistinguishable. Dextrose is a sugar derived synthetically from starch (most commonly 
from corn) and its chemical formula is C6H12O6·H2O. Fructose is a very sweet sugar, 
which is derived from dextrose, and its chemical formula is C6H12O6. High-fructose corn 
syrup is produced by the enzymatic conversion of a portion of the dextrose in corn syrup 
to fructose. The composition of the most common HFCS, HFCS-55, is 55 percent 
fructose, 40 percent dextrose, and 6 percent higher saccharides. It is chemically similar to 
invert sugar used in soft drinks, which is a mixture of equal parts of dextrose and fructose 
produced by enzymatic action on sucrose. The fact that identical, or nearly identical 
sugars can be produced from different crops provides producers and consumers with a 
wide range of substitution possibilities. However, it also means that sugar policies are 
often complex as the different industries vie for support. For example, sugar producers in 
the E.U. have been able to legislate quotas on HFCS production in order to limit 
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competition. Japan also limits HFCS production in order to prevent it from further 
eroding sugar’s market share. In the U.S., HFCS producers benefit from high sugar prices 
and are powerful supporters of current sugar policies.  
Sugar beets are an annual root crop grown in temperate climates, while sugar cane 
is a tall perennial grass grown in tropical and semitropical climates. About 55 countries 
grow sugar beets and 105 countries grow sugar cane according to the FAO. The process 
of extracting sugar (sucrose) from sugar beets or sugar cane requires that the juice be 
extracted and processed in a factory near where the beet or cane is grown. The 
byproducts of sugar cane are bagasse and molasses. Bagasse is the residue of cane, after 
the juice is extracted. It has some industrial uses and is often used to fuel the boilers in 
the sugar factory (also called a sugar mill). Molasses is an edible byproduct as well as an 
animal feed. The byproducts of sugar beets are beet tops, which are the leafy portion of 
the beet used for animal feed, and molasses which is also used primarily as an animal 
feed. Once harvested, sugar cane is highly perishable and must be processed quickly. 
Sugar beets are less perishable than sugar cane, but still must be processed in a timely 
fashion after harvest. In addition, the high cost of transporting sugar beets or cane 
precludes locating the factory distant from the producing areas.  
Sugar growers and sugar processors are economically interdependent, and 
normally share in the value of total sugar and molasses sales according to a contractual 
agreement. Both can influence the value of total output since the volume and sugar 
content of sugar beets or cane is affected by input use and production practices, and the 
recovery of sugar from beets or cane is dependent on the technology and operation of the 
sugar factory. Various ownership arrangements exist in the sugar industry--ranging from 
ownership of the factory and producing lands by a single company to independent 
growers who contract production with a factory. Some growers are members of 
cooperatives, which own and operate a sugar factory. State ownership of factories and/or 
lands are still common in developing countries, but there has been substantial 
privatization in recent years. 
The processes for obtaining sugar from beet and cane juice are slightly different, 
involving a two-step process for sugar cane compared to a one-step process for beets. 
Both beet and cane juice contain molasses, but the molasses in raw beet juice has an 
unpleasant taste and, because of that, raw beet sugar is always refined directly into white 
sugar. In contrast, the molasses in raw cane juice has a pleasant taste and cane sugar can 
be consumed directly in its raw form as brown sugar.
2 The process for converting juice 
into white sugar is also more efficient for sugar beets than for sugar cane, and this further 
contributes to the incentives for producing refined white sugar directly from beets. The 
refining of raw cane sugar to remove the molasses and obtain white sugar is costly and 
requires a separate factory.
3 Consequently, many low-income countries use less 
expensive refining techniques to produce sugar. About 10 percent of the world’s sugar 
production is consumed in raw or partially processed form as sugar cane syrup or crystals 
                                                 
2 However, in the U.S. and most industrial countries raw cane sugar is not consumed directly because it 
may have foreign matter and contaminant from bulk shipping. It is refined into white sugar and then the 
molasses is added back to obtain brown sugar. 
3 The standard conversion of raw cane sugar to refined white sugar is that 1.087 unit of raw cane sugar is 
required to produce 1.0 tons of white sugar. This assumes a standard sugar content of the cane of 96 percent 
(96° polarization).   11
in countries in South Asia, East Asia, and Latin America. An example is “gur” produced 
in India by boiling cane juice to produce a cake of brown sugar. In Colombia the same 
product is called “panela.” A better quality intermediate product, which has some of the 
properties of refined white sugar, can also be produced at a lower cost than refining by 
treating raw cane syrup with chemicals to remove the impurities and improve the color 
and quality. This process is somewhat similar to the process of refining beet sugar, and 
the sugar produced is called “plantation white,” “mill white,” “blanco directo,” or 
“crystal” sugar (Fry, 1985, p2).   
Caloric sweeteners produced from corn starch or other commodities such as 
wheat (in the E.U.) or potatoes (in Japan), are used to replace sugar in some uses. The 
most important of these is HFCS, which is an ideal substitute for sugar in a number of 
applications, such as soft drinks, which require liquid sugar. It also has certain flavor 
properties which make it superior to sugar in some uses. Other corn sweeteners have 
specific properties which make them ideal for certain applications, but which limit their 
competitiveness with sugar. Starch-based caloric sweeteners now account for a larger 
share of U.S. caloric sweeteners consumption than does refined sugar, and HFCS use is 





















Trade of HFCS is limited mostly to cross-border shipments because HFCS is 
produced in liquid form and is expensive to transport. Thus, an HFCS industry must 
develop mostly within each country. The three factors which are critical to the 
competitiveness of HFCS with sugar are the cost of sugar, the cost of the corn, and 
economies of scale in HFCS production. The U.S. is the world’s low-cost producer of 
HFCS because of the access to corn at world market prices and large plants which benefit 
from the substantial economies of scale. In contrast, the E.U. is a high-cost producer 
because corn must be purchased at high prices under the Common Agricultural Policy 
and E.U. policies limit sales of HFCS by quotas on individual companies which prevent 































producers from reaching economies of scale. Thus, HFCS has limited market share in the 
sugar and sweetener market in the E.U.  
Artificial non-caloric chemical sweeteners also compete with caloric sweeteners 
among calorie-conscious consumers. The first such sweetener, saccharin, was discovered 
largely by accident in 1879 by a young chemistry research assistant named John Hopkins 
(Harrison, 2001, p60). He noticed that the organic compound he was testing was 
intensely sweet and he named it after the Greek word for sugar, sakcharon. It was used as 
a sweetener for diabetics and the weight conscious until it was banned in the early 1900s. 
Its use was restored during the sugar shortage years of World War I, and it remained 
popular through World War II. By the 1960s, with no other artificial sweetener available, 
its use soared in America. It is now banned in Britain, has restricted use in France, and 
carries a health warning in the U.S. because of suspected links with cancer. But, it is 
currently approved for use in 100 countries. Aspartame was also discovered by accident, 
in 1965, and was approved in the U.S. in 1981 for use as an artificial sweetener (it is 
commonly sold as Nutrasweet). The use of artificial sweeteners has been limited by their 
poor properties in baking since most lack the bulk of sugar. Efforts have been underway 
for many years to develop a non-caloric sweetener which has the taste and feel of sugar in 
baking. One such product is Sucralose, which was approved for use in the U.S. in 1998. It 
is made from sugar and has most of the properties of sugar, except that it is chemically 
altered to prevent it from being digested by the body. Thus, consumers can have their 
cake but not the calories. It has not yet captured a significant share of the sweetener 
market, but it has the potential to increase sugar demand. 
Another product which can be produced from sugar beets, sugar cane, and corn 
(or other crops) is ethanol--a clear colorless, flammable, oxygenated, hydrocarbon with 
chemical formula C2H5HO. Ethanol can be used for a number of purposes including as a 
vehicle fuel, and that use accounts for about two-thirds of world consumption (Berg, 
2001). However, it is normally more costly than petroleum based fuels and it is only used 
when special incentives, such as environmental regulations or government subsidies, are 
used to encourage production and use. Ethanol can be produced from crude oil, ethylene 
and coal, or from agricultural products. Roughly 60 percent of global ethanol production 
is from sugar cane and sugar beets. The process of ethanol production consists of 
fermentation and distillation of the sugars in the basic raw material. In Brazil, half of 
sugar cane production is used for ethanol production and government ethanol policies 
influence the share of sugar cane used for sugar production and export. Brazil began a 
large ethanol production program from sugar cane in 1975 as a way to protect itself 
against high imported fuel prices. However, conditions in the world energy market 
changed and the program was scaled back in the early 1990s, with some of the sugar cane 
previously used for ethanol production being shifted to sugar production. Sugar exports 
from Brazil increased from 1.5 million tons in 1990 to 11.3 million tons in 2000 (USDA) 
and nominal world sugar prices fell from $.27 per kilogram to $.18 per kilogram (World 
Bank, 2003) partly because of the increase. 
The U.S. is a major producer and consumer of ethanol from corn. Ethanol has 
environmental advantages, when used as a fuel, because it is cleaner burning and does not 
produce greenhouse gases. In 1990, the U.S. legislated in the Clean Air Act Amendments 
that certain U.S. regions must use oxygenated, reformulated gasoline during certain high 
smog months, and that a certain percentage of oxygenates must be derived from   13
renewable sources such as corn (Novack, 2002). The legislation provided tax incentives 
which amounted to about $.54 cents per gallon for ethanol when blended with gasoline at 
a 10 percent rate. Some mid-western states provide additional tax incentives. The cost of 
ethanol production from corn is about $1.10 per gallon, but because ethanol contains less 
energy than gasoline the comparable energy-equivalent cost to gasoline is $1.65 per 
gallon (Oregon Office of Energy, 2002). Thus, with the $.54 tax incentive ethanol is 
competitive with regular gasoline at $1.11 per gallon ($1.65-$.54) and very profitable at 
current gasoline prices. In response to the tax incentive, U.S. ethanol production has been 
growing by about 6 percent per year (Berg, 2001). Since both HFCS and ethanol can be 
produced in the same facility by adding an additional ethanol unit to an HFCS producing 
facility, the tax incentive on ethanol production partly finances the facilities which can be 
used for HFCS production. A seasonal complimentarity between ethanol and HFCS 
production is also possible because ethanol is used for fuels primarily during the winter 
months while the demand for HFCS use in soft drinks increases during summer months. 
The U.S. ethanol policy contributes to production capacity which can also be used for 
HFCS production and thereby reduces HFCS production costs and makes HFCS more 
competitive with sugar. 
 
Costs of Production Estimates 
 
Costs of production vary among countries for a variety of reasons, but the 
difference between the cost of producing sugar from beets and sugar from cane is large in 
all countries. London-based consulting firm, LMC International, periodically estimates 
production costs for cane sugar, beet sugar, and HFCS. The most recent cost estimate 
averages are given in Table 1 for low-cost producers and major exporters. The estimates 
cover 41 beet producing countries, 63 cane producing countries, and 19 HFCS producing 
countries. LMC bases its estimates on an engineering cost approach that accounts for the 
physical inputs of labor, machinery, fuel, chemicals, and fertilizers used in field and 
processing operations. The estimates are of actual average costs, and estimates include 
the impact of policies that protect producers in certain countries. Such cost estimates do 
not represent the supply curve normally estimated by economists since they are not 
estimates of marginal costs, however, they are useful for comparing average costs of 
production for different products and countries computed using a consistent 
methodology. Actual raw cane sugar and corn prices are provided for comparison, (note 
that the prices are f.o.b. while costs are ex-factory and thus the prices should be higher).  
  The average cost of producing raw cane sugar by major exporters, was 10.39 U.S. 
cents per pound during 1994/95-1998/99, and the average cost of refined cane sugar was 
14.25 cents per pound. The raw-to-white spread averaged 3.86 cents per pound. Refined 
sugar from beets cost an average of 25.31 cents per pound—78 percent more than refined 
cane sugar. Among low-cost producers, the difference between refined cane and beet 
sugar was even wider. The average production cost for low-cost producers of refined 
cane sugar was 11.44 cents per pound compared to 22.29 cents per pound for refined beet 
sugar—a difference of 95 percent. Based on this comparison, sugar from beets was not 
competitive with sugar from cane by either major exporters or low-cost producers. 
However, the wide margin between refined sugar from beets and cane is partly a   14
reflection of protection to sugar beet producers in the E.U. and U.S., which encourages 
production in marginal areas and contributes to higher average costs.  
  HFCS-55 production costs averaged 13.68 cents per pound and were lower than 
white sugar from cane produced by major exporters in four of the five years. They only 
exceeded the cost of cane sugar when corn prices rose sharply in 1995/96. Thus, it 
appears that HFCS-55 can compete with refined cane sugar in the current policy 
environment, and perhaps even in a fully liberalized market environment since many 
studies have suggested that raw sugar prices would rise more than corn prices under a 
liberalized policy environment.  
  The LMC International estimates do not provide information on variable and 
fixed costs that would be needed to determine the average price at which producers 
would stop producing. However, such information is available for the U.S. from the 
USDA for refined beet sugar and raw cane sugar. They estimate that approximately 63 
percent of total costs of U.S. producers of refined beet sugar are variable costs and 64 
percent of production costs of raw cane sugar are variable costs. Based on these 
estimates, U.S. producers could face about a 60 percent price decline before average 
variable costs would not be recovered. If a similar structure of variable and fixed costs 
applied to other producers, then it would partly explain the slow response of supply to 
declines in prices. In addition, many countries have policies that keep producer prices 
higher than world market prices.  
    
Table 1. Average Costs of Producing Cane Sugar, Beet Sugar, and High-Fructose Corn 
Syrup by Categories of Producers, and Actual Corn and Sugar Prices 1994/95 – 1998/99. 
Category  1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
  U.S. cents per pound /1 
Raw  cane  sugar      
  Low cost producers /2    7.43    8.10    8.18    7.78  7.58 
  Major exporters /3  10.37  10.60  10.72  10.52  9.73 
Cane sugar, white equiv.           
  Low cost producers /2  11.02  11.75  11.84  11.41  11.19 
  Major exporters /3  14.23  14.48  14.61  14.38  13.53 
Beet  sugar,  refined       
  Low cost producers /4  21.31  23.16  23.09  21.21  22.67 
  Major exporters /5  25.47  26.87  25.90  23.56  24.75 
High-fructose  corn  syrup/6       
     Major producers /7  13.45  16.78  13.57  12.86  11.76 
Actual  Market  Prices      
     Corn /8  102.8  162.6  128.8  112.4  93.8 
     Raw cane sugar /9  13.53  12.23  11.21  10.71  7.05 
1/ Measured in nominal U.S. cents per pound, ex-mill, factory basis.  2/  Average of five producing regions 
(Australia, Brazil – Center/South, Guatemala, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). 3/  Average of seven countries 
(Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, South Africa, and Thailand).  4/  Average of seven 
countries ( Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States).  5/  Average of 
four countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and Turkey).  6/  HFCS-55, dry weight.  7/  Average of 19 
countries (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungry, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States).  /8 Corn 
price is US$/ton, July-June average of monthly prices for US No. 2 yellow corn, fob U.S. Gulf.  /9 Raw 
cane sugar price is US cents per kg, July-June average of monthly prices, fob Caribbean ports.  
Source:  LMC International as reported in Sugar and Sweetener Situation & Outlook, Economic Research 
Service, USDA, September 2001. Actual market prices are from World Bank databases.   15
Employment  
 
  Estimates of employment in developing countries’ sugar industries are not readily 
available, but they can be developed from various reports, surveys, and industry 
statements. Such estimates (Table 2) show considerable cross-country consistency among 
high and low-cost producers. For example, Brazil, Guyana and South Africa are known to 
be among the lowest-cost producers and the raw sugar production per industry employee 
for these countries is estimated to range from 16.3 to 19.9 tons. In contrast, countries 
which are known to be high cost producers such as Fiji, Kenya and Mauritius have 
production of 7.0 to 8.3 tons of raw sugar per industry employee. Thus, we can 
reasonably conclude that an additional million tons of sugar production from a low cost 
sugar producing developing country would generate about 55,500 direct employment 
jobs. If the exports came from a high-cost producer, the same million tons of production 
would generate about 128,000 direct employment jobs. Additional indirect employment 
jobs would also be generated in transportation and related industries, but no attempt was 
made to estimate these jobs. 
 
Table 2. Raw sugar produced per sugar industry employee,  selected  
developing countries. 
 
   Country 
Direct Employment 
(growers and factory) 
Tons of Raw Sugar 
Produced 
Average 1999-2000 
Tons of Raw 
Sugar Produced 
Per Employee 
Low Cost Producers   
  Brazil  1,100,000 19,485,000 17.7 
  Guyana  18,000 293,072  16.3 
  South Africa  130,000 2,589,667  19.9 
   
High Cost Producers   
  Fiji  40,500 336,333   8.3 
  Kenya  69,000 485,333   7.0 
  Mauritius  65,000 529,299   8.1 
  
Other Producers   
  Malawi  17,000 200,667 11.8 
  Mexico  300,000 5,069,233 16.9 
  
Notes and Sources: Production is the 3 year average of raw sugar production during 
1999-2001 from FAOSTAT. Employment comes from various sources and includes total 
direct employment in sugar factories and the number of growers. Employment data for 
Brazil is from OECD (1999), Fiji and Guyana data are from F.O.Lichts, Kenya data is 
from the Kenya Sugar Board, Malawi data is from the Malawi Ministry of Commerce 
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The World Market  
 
India, the European Union, and Brazil are the largest sugar producers with 
roughly 14 percent of world production each during 1999-2001 (Table 3). They are 
followed by the United States and China which each produce about 6 percent of the 
world’s sugar. Sugar trade is dominated by Brazil and Russia, with Brazil accounting for 
about one-quarter of world net exports and Russia accounting for about 14 percent of 
world net imports during 1999-2001. The E.U. is the second largest net exporter, and it is 
followed by Australia, Thailand and Cuba which each export about 8-10 percent of the 
world total. Net imports are widely dispersed after Russia, with the next largest net 
importer accounting for less than 5 five percent of world imports. India is the largest 
sugar consumer with about 15 percent of world consumption, followed by the E.U. with 
10 percent, and Brazil with 7 percent.  
 
Table 3. Major sugar producers, net exporters and net importers, 1999-2001 average. 
Producers  Net Exporters  Net Importers 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
Country/Region Million 
  tons 
  India    19.4    Brazil    9.3    Russia    5.2 
  E.U.    18.6    E.U.    4.2    Indonesia    1.7 
  Brazil    18.5    Australia    3.8    Japan    1.6 
  U.S.      7.9    Thailand    3.6    U.S.    1.4 
  China      7.8    Cuba    3.2    Korea, Rep.    1.2 
  Thailand      5.4    R. S. Africa    1.3    Canada    1.2 
  Mexico      5.1    Guatemala    1.1    Iran    1.0 
  Australia      4.9    Colombia    1.0    Malaysia    1.0 
  Cuba      3.8    Turkey    0.6    Algeria    0.9 
  Pakistan      3.0    Mauritius    0.5    Nigeria    0.7 
  All Other    38.9    All other  10.3    All other  20.7 
  World  133.3    World  38.9    World  36.6 
Source: USDA PS&D 2002. Note: Data is in raw sugar equivalents. 
 
World HFCS production averaged 11.7 million tons (dry weight basis) during 
1999-2001, and U.S. production averaged 9.2 million tons—79 percent of the world total. 
Japan was the second largest producer, with an average of .78 million tons, followed by 
Argentina, Canada, European Union, Mexico, and Republic of Korea with between .3 
and .4 million tons each. HFCS is considered equivalent to sugar on a dry weight basis 
when used to produce products such as soft drinks. Thus, when sugar plus HFCS are 
combined, U.S. to obtain total caloric sweeteners production increased to 17.1 million 
tons of caloric sweeteners. 
World sugar prices have historically been characterized by periodic sharp 
increases followed by long periods of low or declining prices (Figure 3a). This pattern 
has been caused, in large part, by policies in both developed and developing countries 
that isolated consumers and producers from international prices and diminished their 
price responsiveness. However, this has been changing somewhat as some developing 
countries have reformed their policies during the past two decades and the share of 
developing countries in global consumption and imports has increased due to population 
and income growth (Figure 3c and 3f). This has led to greater price responsiveness by   17
 


















































































































































































sugar producers and consumers and likely reduces the severity of future price spikes. The 
collapse of the former Soviet Union also led to the abandonment of dedicated sugar 
imports from Cuba and increased trade at world market prices. Many developed countries 
still maintain highly protected sugar sectors and thus contribute to the likelihood of  price 
spikes, but they now account for only one-third of consumption and one-half of imports 
compared to slightly more than half of world consumption and 60 percent of imports 
when the last sugar price spike occurred in 1980.  
Despite some liberalization of sugar policies, roughly 80 percent of world 
production and 60 percent of world trade is at subsidized or protected prices. Only 3 
major producers (Australia, Brazil, and Cuba) have sugar sectors which produce and 
operate at world market price levels.
4 These 3 producers account for a combined 20 
percent of world production and 40 percent of world trade. The remaining 80 percent of 
world production and 60 percent of world trade relies on production subsidies, export 
subsidies, or preferential access to protected markets. The E.U., Japan and the United 
States account for 20 percent of world production and have average producer prices 
which are more than double the world market. China and India account for another 20 
percent of world production and protect producers with prices which are higher than 
world market prices. The remaining 40 percent of production is in countries which either 
produce for preferential markets (as is the case with Fiji, Mauritius, Philippines and many 
others) and thus receive higher than world market prices, or they protect their domestic 
producers with policies which restrict imports to provide above market prices.  
An important change that has taken place in the world sugar market has been the 
increasing share of developing countries in world sugar consumption and imports, and 
the increasing share of developed countries in exports. About two-thirds of world sugar 
consumption is now in developing countries, compared to one-third in 1970, and sugar 
consumption is growing by about 2.6 percent per annum in developing countries 
compared to no growth in developed countries (Figure 3c and Appendix Table A1). 
Approximately one-half of world sugar imports are now by developing countries 
compared to less than one-quarter in 1970 (Figure 3f). This has diminished the 
importance of developed country imports to developing country sugar exporters. It also 
reflects increased competition from developed countries exporters, which are heavily 
concentrated in refined sugar (primarily the E.U.) which has reduced export opportunities 
for value added refined sugar exports from developing countries.  
The more rapid consumption growth in developing countries is partly a reflection 
of more rapid income and population growth and higher income elasticities, but it also is 
a reflection of higher protection in developed countries which has reduced demand 
growth and encouraged use of substitute sweeteners such as HFCS. High protection has 
also increased exports from some developed countries (especially the E.U.), and such 
exports have often been supported by export subsidies. Developed countries accounted 
for 40 percent of world exports during the 1990s compared to 30 percent during the 
1970s. This role reversal of developing countries exporting a primarily tropical 
commodity has contributed to the slow growth of world sugar trade and reduced export 
opportunities for developing country producers. 
                                                 
4 Brazil has government policies on ethanol which indirectly affect sugar, but no direct subsidies to sugar 
producers. Other small sugar producers which produce at world market prices include Canada and 
Malaysia.   19
 The value of world sugar exports has remained relatively constant in nominal 
dollars ($11.8 billion during 1980-85 vs. $11.6 billion during 1995-2000), and sugar has 
remained an important source of export earnings for a number of developing countries. 
However, the share of developing countries’ exports of total sugar exports has declined 
from 71 percent during 1980-85 to 54 percent in 1995-2000, as developed country 
exports have increased and the share of higher-valued refined sugar exports by developed 
countries has increased. Twelve countries received 10 percent or more of their total 
export earnings from sugar during 1995-2000, and an additional 5 received 5-10 percent 
of total export earnings from sugar (Table 4).  In contrast, during 1980-85, 10 countries 
received 20 percent or more of total exports from sugar, and 9 additional countries 
received from 5 to 20 percent of total export earnings from sugar.   
 
Table 4. Sugar Exports and Export Shares, 1995-2000 and 1980-85. 
Country  Sugar Export Share of Total 
Merchandise Exports (percent) 
Sugar Exports 









       
Gambia      91.4  1/    9.5       25 1/       4 
Réunion       63.0  2/  75.2      131 2/      75 
Cuba 40.6  76.4  803  4,594 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  37.1  53.8    15       11 
Fiji Islands  25.4  46.9   187     134 
Belize  24.5  36.0     51      35 
Guyana  23.5  32.6    153      87 
Mauritius  20.5  54.9    415     215 
Swaziland  16.9  37.5    183     114 
Dominican Rep.  14.0  35.7    153     320 
Guadeloupe        11.5  /3  22.0           19  /3      19 
Barbados  11.3  10.0      36      30 
Guatemala  9.8  5.7     280     66 
Jamaica  6.5  6.8     119     53 
Mozambique  6.1  7.3      17     13 
Moldova. Rep.  5.3   n.a.      42     n.a. 
Malawi  5.0  12.9      31     35 
Notes:  1/ Data for Gambia was incomplete and this result is for 1999 and 2000 only.  
2/  Data for Réunion was incomplete and this result is for 1995 only.  
3/  Data for Guadeloupe was incomplete and this result is for 1995 only. 
Source:  FAOSTAT. 
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IV.   Sugar Policies in Selected Developing Countries 
 
While the focus of this paper is on policy reform prospects in the E.U., Japan, and 
the United States, it is also useful to look at policies in other major sugar producing and 
trading countries to see how these countries would likely be affected by such reforms. 
Some of these countries have policies which are similar to those of the E.U. (Thailand) or 
the U.S. (China) and domestic market liberalization in these countries would lead to 
substantial changes in production, consumption, and trade, with important implications 
for the world sugar market. There are also important cases of unilateral sugar policy 
reforms (Brazil) which have occurred during the past two decades and these countries 
would be more directly affected by reforms in the E.U., Japan, and the U.S. 
  Brazil is the world’s largest sugar exporter and it is generally considered to be the 
world’s lowest cost producer. It would be a major beneficiary of increased world sugar 
trade and higher prices because it has the capacity to substantially increase sugar 
production and exports. Domestic retail sugar prices in September 2001 were U.S.7.7 
cents per pound (Bolling and Suarez, 2001) compared to U.S. retail prices of roughly 40 
cents per pound. The devaluation of the Brazilian real by 65 percent, relative to the dollar 
since end-1998 contributed to the competitiveness of sugar exports. However, despite the 
dominance of Brazil’s sugar exports in the world market, exports are viewed as the third 
alternative for Brazilian sugar cane after production of ethanol and sugar for the large 
domestic market. Only half of Brazil’s sugar cane is used to produce sugar and the other 
half is used to produce ethanol for automotive fuel. Sugar cane production can easily be 
directed between sugar and ethanol production depending on market conditions and 
government policies. If all the sugar cane was used to produce sugar, production would 
roughly double (an increase of roughly 18.5 million tons), and most of this could be 
exported subject to port capacity. The government has pursued a biofuel policy since the 
1970s, when concerns about the adequacy of petroleum supplies were high. These 
policies included tax incentives and direct subsidies to ethanol production and use, sugar 
price controls, and restrictions on sugar exports. Lower petroleum prices during the 1980s 
led to reduced ethanol subsidies and the removal of export and price controls on sugar 
beginning in 1990. Other controls on sugar were eased during the 1990s and sugar 
exports increased from 1.5 million tons in 1990/91 to 11.3 million tons in 2000/01, 
making Brazil the world’s largest exporter. Some subsidies remain on ethanol production 
and use, and the future of such subsidies can strongly influence the use of sugar cane for 
ethanol versus sugar production. Government mandates on the share of ethanol to be 
included in gasoline (currently 20 to 24 percent) can strongly influences demand for 
ethanol as automotive fuel and the supplies of sugar cane directed to sugar production. 
Sugar cane production has increased rapidly in the Centre-South region where sugar cane 
faces a favorable climate, available land, and favorable returns relative to other crops. 
Sugar is also produced in the Northeast region where high cost growers receive a small 
subsidy. The central government allocates Brazil’s total annual premium priced U.S. 
sugar import quota to this region. Further expansion of sugar cane production in the 
Centre-South region is possible and expected by most industry experts, but milling 
capacity will need to be expanded to allow significantly more sugar production. The 
future of the biofuel program is important to the future of sugar exports and this depends 
on international petroleum prices as well as Brazilian policy. Recently marketed flex-fuel   21
engines which run equally well on gasoline or pure hydrous alcohol are expected to boost 
ethanol demand and direct some sugar cane production away from sugar production. 
(This section is based on ABARE 1999, Bolling and Suarez, 2001, and F.O. Licht 2002 
and 2003). 
  China has been an occasional large sugar importer and exporter over the past 
decade, but average net imports were about 400,000 tons during 1990-2000. Most of 
these imports came from Cuba under a long-term trade agreement. The government has 
followed a policy aimed at self-sufficiency by providing strong price incentives to 
producers, controlling imports, and accumulating and releasing government stocks so as 
to maintain high internal market prices. About 90 percent of China’s sugar production 
comes from sugar cane and the remainder from sugar beets. A ‘guidance price’ is 
provided to sugar refiners for sugar cane and beet, but market forces largely determine 
prices (ABARE, 1999). The policy and strong demand growth kept sugar prices high 
during most of the 1990s, but prices fell sharply following the record 1998/99 crop and 
remained low through 2000. Prices increased in 2001, with white wholesale sugar prices 
averaging about $.22 per pound during the first half 2001 (F.O. Licht, 2002, page 38), 
which was more than double the world market price and similar to U.S. domestic prices. 
A record 2002/03 harvest caused prices to fall. Artificial sweeteners, mainly saccharin, 
are an important competitor to sugar in China and substitute for as much as 2.4 million 
tons of sugar (F.O. Licht, 2002 page 233). When China entered the WTO in 2001, it 
agreed to a tariff rate quota of 1.6 million tons at a tariff rate of 20 percent with an over-
quota tariff of 76 percent. The quota is scheduled to increase to 1.945 million tons and the 
over-quota rate is scheduled to fall to 65 percent by 2004. If China were to import the full 
amount specified by the tariff rate quota, imports would increase substantially over the 
levels of recent years. However, China’s WTO tariff quota does not commit the country 
to import all of the tariff quota tonnage and China can choose among a number of 
different methods of administering the tariff rate quota to influence the tariff quota fill 
rate (Jolly, 2001). For example, actual imports during 2001/02 were 1.15 million tons 
according to the International Sugar Organization (2002) despite the tariff rate quota of 
1.6 million tons. The Chinese sugar industry would undergo substantial adjustment if it 
were opened to international competition. A large number of small high-cost sugar mills 
would be unprofitable and production would likely decline.  
  India’s sugar industry is heavily regulated under the Essential Commodities Act 
of 1955, and is very politicized because of the large number of sugar cane growers 
(reported to total 5 million) and the importance of sugar in Indian diets (F.O. Licht, 
2002). The industry is largely self sufficient, with occasional imports to offset domestic 
shortfalls. An import duty (currently 60 percent) is varied to control imports in order to 
maintain domestic prices above world market prices. Large stocks of sugar currently 
burden the industry and can only be exported with substantial subsidies or at substantial 
losses. India provides an internal freight reimbursement and ocean freight subsidy to help 
export surplus production. State controls limit internal sugar movements, and licensing 
and stock holding requirements for mills and shops contribute to industry inefficiencies. 
Sugar mills are small and inefficient, and high internal transport costs limit export 
potential even if world prices rose above internal prices. Sugar millers and importers are 
required to sell a portion of their supplies to the Public Distribution System (PDS) at 
below market prices for resale to low income consumers. The mandated share of supplies   22
which goes to the PDS has declined over time, with for example, sugar millers currently 
required to sell only 10 percent of production to the PDS compared to 70 percent during 
the 1970s. Sugar cane production is more profitable than most other crops, because sugar 
cane producers receive prices which are about 50 percent higher than world market prices 
due to central government established minimums and higher State Advised Prices 
established by individual state governments. India provides an internal freight 
reimbursement and ocean freight subsidy to help export surplus production. India has a 
small ethanol program, and there are government proposals to require ethanol to be 
blended with gasoline to produce a cleaner burning fuel to reduce pollution. The 
government has announced plans to liberalize the sector, however, past efforts at 
liberalization have been unsuccessful and government pre-conditions for liberalization 
appear difficult to meet. Decades of regulation have also created complicated political 
interdependencies which will be difficult to disentangle and hamper liberalization. It is 
unlikely that India would emerge as a significant exporter if policies in the E.U., Japan 
and the U.S. were changed to allow greater imports.  
  Kenya is a small sugar producer, but the industry is still a major employer. Sugar 
cane production totals about 400,000 tons of raw sugar per year and imports total another 
200,000 tons. The sugar industry employs approximately 29,000 workers,
5 and 40,000 
smallholders grow sugar cane on an out-grower basis.
6  The sugar sector has been 
partially liberalized since 1995, and a new Sugar Act became effective in April 2002, 
which created the Kenya Sugar Board to replace the previous Kenya Sugar Authority. 
The Act continued the broad authority of the Sugar Board and the Minister of Agriculture 
to control all aspects of the sugar industry (production, manufacturing, marketing, 
imports and exports of sugar and its by-products). A development levy of 7 percent is 
imposed by the Sugar Board on all domestically produced and imported sugar. Sugar 
imports from COMESA
7 countries are subject to the VAT of 18 percent and the 
development levy of 7 percent. Imports from countries outside of COMESA face a 100 
percent duty plus the 18 percent VAT and 7 percent development levy. In 2001, imports 
from COMESA countries rose sharply and accounted for 40 percent of total imports. 
Subsequently, a temporary quota was negotiated with COMESA countries to limit 
imports. Kenya lost its preferential ACP sugar quota to the E.U. a number of years ago 
because it failed to file the required documents to invoke the force majeure clause when 
it failed to meet its quota. It has been attempting to regain its quota for the past several 
years, and the E.U. has granted Kenya a temporary quota of 11,000 tons under its Special 
Preference program. Sugar prices in Kenya are nearly double the world market price 
because of border measures. However, a large part of the industry could compete at 
international prices according to industry experts.  
  Mexico privatized its sugar mills, and partially deregulated its sugar industry in 
reforms which concluded in 1992 (Escandon, 2002). However, it has maintained strong 
government regulation of the sector by setting sugar cane prices for its 150,000 sugar 
                                                 
5 Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, 2001. 
6 Kenya Sugar Board Year Book of Sugar Statistics 2001. 
7 Kenya is one of the founding members of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), which was launched in October 2000 to allow goods to be traded duty-free. The other 
members of COMESA are Djibouti, Egypt, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
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cane growers. Mexico liberalized pricing and production of sugar in 1995, but 
simultaneously increased protection by increasing tariffs on raw sugar from 65 percent to 
136 percent and from 73 to 127 percent on refined sugar (F.O. Licht, 2002, page 157). 
This led to a 60 percent increase in domestic sugar prices and contributed to a 50 percent 
increase in production from 1992 to 2002 and a doubling of exports. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force on January 1, 1994 with a 15 year 
adjustment period ending in 2008, after which, there will be free trade in sugar between 
Mexico and the United States. The implementation of NAFTA has been contentious 
because of a last minute side-letter agreement on sugar which was added in order to get 
U.S. Congressional approval. The side-letter agreement was never ratified by the 
Mexican Congress and is not recognized as valid by Mexico. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
government administers NAFTA in accordance with the side-letter agreement. Under 
NAFTA, the amount of Mexico’s duty-free access to the U.S. sugar market depends on 
whether Mexico is a surplus sugar producer (sugar production minus sugar consumption). 
However, the side-letter agreement changed the definition of surplus producer to include 
combined sugar and HFCS consumption. Using this definition, Mexico could export up 
to 25,000 tons per year of surplus production sugar duty-free during the first 6 years of 
NAFTA. Beginning in year 7 (the 2000/01 marketing year), and until the end of the 15 
year adjustment period, Mexico can export up to 250,000 tons of surplus sugar 
production duty-free. High domestic sugar prices in Mexico led to large imports and 
increased production of HFCS which quickly displaced sugar in the soft-drinks industry 
and left Mexico with large sugar stocks which could not be exported duty-free to the U.S. 
because of the 25,000 ton limit. The U.S. rejected a request to allow increased duty-free 
exports from Mexico, and Mexico then charged that the U.S. was dumping HFCS in 
Mexico and initiated anti-dumping duties of 20 percent on beverages made with HFCS. 
The 60 local sugar mills were caught between high prices which the government 
established for sugar cane and the weak domestic and world market prices for sugar, and 
many became insolvent. The government expropriated 27 mills with large and un-payable 
debts in September 2001. Government investments are being made to prepare these mills 
for re-sale to private investors. The government recently announced its national sugar 
policy for 2002-2006 designed to help the sector become profitable (F.O. Lichts 2002, 
page 159). Among the measures is the creation of a sugar export cooperative association 
of all private and government-owned sugar mills which is solely authorized to export 
sugar. Mexico’s sugar exports in the 2001/02 marketing year are estimated to total about 
650,000 tons of which 148,000 was exported to the U.S. duty-free. Negotiations are 
continuing to resolve the trade and duties on HFCS. Beginning in 2009, Mexico will have 
unlimited duty-free access to the U.S. sugar market and will likely increase exports 
substantially. 
Russia is by far the world’s largest sugar importer, with average imports of 5.2 
million tons during 1999-2001 compared to the next largest importer with 1.7 million 
tons. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian sugar sector faced an 
uncertain future, an unstable and confused policy structure, and a technically weak 
industry. Sugar production is from beets, and sugar beet production declined by about 45 
percent from 1992 to 2000, sugar consumption declined by 17 percent, and sugar imports 
increased by 35 percent (USDA). Low beet yields, poor factory recovery rates, outdated 
technology, and shortages of fuel and machinery replacement parts hampered the   24
adjustment of the Russian sugar industry to privatization. Foreign investment has been 
small due to high perceived risks and this slowed the modernization of the industry. 
Trade policy changed frequently, and the government uses high tariffs to protect the 
domestic industry. Tariffs on white sugar are higher than on raw sugar to protect 
domestic sugar refiners. Seasonal tariffs are added during periods of peak domestic 
production to protect local producers and support prices. The import duty on raw cane 
sugar for 2003 has been set at $95/ton ($.043 per pound) (F.O. Licht, 2002). Russia is 
expected to remain a large importer as long as the investment climate remains uncertain 
and foreign companies are reluctant to invest. Even with foreign investment, Russia will 
likely remain a high-cost producer because its industry is based on sugar beets. 
Thailand is the fourth-largest exporter, with net exports of 3.6 million tons during 
1999-2001. Thailand’s sugar policy is patterned after that of the E.U., with high internal 
sugar prices which are maintained by quotas and import tariffs, and ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ 
production quotas designed to expand exports. The government also provides tax 
incentives to encourage exports and subsidized credit to millers and exporters. The tariff 
rate quota agreed under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture was 65 percent for within 
quota imports in 1999 and 99 percent for outside quota imports (ABARE, 1999, page 
129-130). Despite high protection, Thailand’s cost of production are among the lowest in 
the world and about comparable to those of Australia (Borrell and Pearce, 1999). High 
protection and low costs have led to rapid growth of production and a more than tripling 
of exports over the past two decades.  
This selective review of policies in major sugar producing and trading countries 
reinforces the significance of policy distortions in the world sugar market. India, the 
largest sugar producer, has a heavily regulated domestic sugar market and high import 
tariffs to protect local producers. China, has import restrictions which keep domestic 
sugar prices very near those in the United States. Russia, the largest sugar net importer, 
has high tariffs to protect sugar beet producers and additional tariffs on white sugar to 
further protect local refiners. Brazil, the largest sugar exporter, has a sugar policy which 
is partly driven by its own biofuel policies and until recently had restrictions on sugar 
exports. Thailand, the fourth largest net exporter and a low cost sugar producer, has used 
high domestic prices, tax incentives, and subsidized credit to increase exports. Mexico, 
has high domestic prices which have stimulated production in anticipation of unlimited 
duty-free access to the U.S. sugar market beginning in 2009. Kenya has high tariffs and 
import quotas to protect domestic producers.  
 
V.   Sugar Policies in Selected OECD Countries 
 
More than half of the value of sugar production in OECD countries during 1999-2001 
came from government support or transfers from consumers. Such high support typically 
limits consumption, through high prices to consumers, and encourages production even 
when a country does not have a comparative advantage in sugar production. Support to 
OECD sugar producers during 1999-2001 totaled $6.35 billion, compared to the value of 
world sugar trade of about $11.6 billion and developing country exports of about $6.5 
billion. The E.U. provided the largest support, with $2.71 billion in support to sugar 
producers, while the U.S. provided $1.30 billion, and Japan provided $0.44 billion. A 
number of developing countries also provided high levels of support to sugar producers   25
including Mexico, Turkey, and Poland (Table 5). Much of this support is provided 
through border protection. 
 


















      
OECD 6,351  2.11   
Australia       51  1.11    0.0 
Czech Republic       16  1.25  47.6 
E.U. 2,713  2.11  91.7 
Hungary       12  1.20  41.5 
Japan     437  2.17  88.7 
Mexico     713  2.10  83.9 
Poland     176  2.28  92.9 
Slovak Rep.      16  1.94  54.7 
Switzerland      86  4.36  73.0 
Turkey     749  3.02  95.8 
U.S.A. 1,302  2.37  84.3 
      
Notes: Producer Support was converted from local currency to U.S. dollars using period average annual 
exchange rates from the IMF’s IFS, May 2002. Producer Nominal Assistance Coefficient is an indicator 
of the nominal rate of assistance to producers measuring the ratio between the value of gross farm receipts 
including support and gross farm receipts valued at world market prices without support. 
No calculations were made for Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, or the Republic of Korea. 
Source: OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries, Monitoring and Evaluation, June 2002. 
 
The benefits to more liberalized trade in sugar, especially in OECD countries, are 
substantial according to a number of studies: Borrell and Pearce (1999), Elbehri, et al. 
(2000), GAO (1993 and 2000), Sheales, et al. (1999), USITC (2002), and Wohlgenant 
(1999). The results of the various studies differ because of different assumptions, 
methodology, and scenarios, however, the general conclusions are that reduced support to 
OECD sugar producers would result in lower production in those countries, lower prices, 
increased consumption, and increased net imports. World sugar prices would increase 
and exports from developing countries, and some developed country exporters, would 
increase. According to Sheales, et al. (1999), the full liberalization of the world sugar 
market would result in a 41 percent increase in world sugar prices.  Sugar imports would 
increase by 44 percent in the U.S. and exports would decline by 34 percent in the E.U. 
Low-cost sugar producing countries would increase exports, with Australia’s exports 
rising 16 percent, Brazil’s exports rising 23 percent, and Thailand’s exports rising 22 
percent. Removal of government support programs to domestic producers in the E.U., 
Japan, and the U.S. would save consumers $4.8 billion per year according to the report. A 
study by the GAO (2000) concluded that the U.S. sugar program resulted in a net loss to   26
the U.S. economy of $1 billion in 1998. Elbehri, et al. (2000) used the GTAP multi-
sectoral, multi-regional general equilibrium model to examine the impacts of partially 
liberalizing sugar TRQ import regimes, and concluded that if the E.U.’s over-quota tariff 
was cut by one-third, it would result in a global welfare gain of $568 million. 
Coordinated global reforms would result in the greatest benefits. Wohlgenant (1999) 
estimated that global sugar trade liberalization would result in a 43 percent increase in 
world price. 
Borrell and Pearce (1999) used a 24 region model of the global sweetener market 
to examine consumption, production, trade, price, and welfare effects for 7 classes of 
sweeteners. A baseline projection which continued current protection was compared with 
a fully liberalized sweetener market with no trade protection in any country or region. 
Under the fully liberalized scenario (vs. the baseline), sugar prices were projected to fall 
65 percent in Japan, 40 percent in Western Europe, 25 percent in the United States, 
Mexico, Indonesia, Eastern Europe, and by 10 percent in China, the Ukraine, and 
Philippines. Lower prices would lead to higher consumption, lower production, and 
increased imports of sugar in those countries which have trade protection. World prices 
would increase by 38 percent and lower-cost producers would increase production and 
exports—however consumption decreased with the higher prices.  In countries with the 
highest protection (Japan, Western Europe, the U.S., Indonesia, and Eastern Europe) net 
imports increased by 15 million tons per year. Japan reduced production by 44 percent, 
the U.S. by 32 percent, and Western Europe by 21 percent. Among low-cost producers 
and exporters, Australia and Thailand increased production by 25 percent, and Brazil, 
Cuba and Other America (Latin America excluding Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba) increased 
production by about 15 percent.  
Increased sugar imports of 15 million tons by the countries with the highest 
protection would generate about one million jobs in the sugar industries of developing 
countries according to the employment estimates from Table 2. Most of these new jobs 
would be in the lowest cost producers (Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala other Latin American 
producers, Sudan and Thailand) while jobs would be lost in the countries with highest 
protection. Some jobs would be lost in the countries which currently have preferential 
access to the E.U. and U.S. sugar markets.  
Global welfare gains from liberalization are estimated by Borrell and Pearce to 
total $4.7 billion per year based on historical supply responses and may be as high as $6.3 
billion per year if higher supply responses occur. Brazilian producers gains the most from 
liberalization, at around $2.6 billion per year, but this is offset by a loss of $1 billion to 
Brazilian consumers who pay higher prices after liberalization—leaving a net gain of 
$1.6 billion for Brazil. Japan had a net gain of about $0.4 billion from lower consumer 
prices which more than offset lower producer prices on the 40 percent of sugar which is 
domestically produced. The United States had a small net loss of about $0.2 billion from 
full liberalization, as producer losses were slightly larger than consumer gains. Western 
Europe had a net gain of about $1.5 billion as consumer gains of about $4.8 billion 
exceeded producer losses of about $3.3 billion. One general interpretation of these results 
is that protection in the world sugar market is imposed by developed countries at great 
cost to themselves and developing countries with the economic potential to expand 
exports.    27
The exporting countries which currently have preferential access to the E.U. and 
U.S. sugar markets gain about $0.8 billion per year (relative to world market prices) from 
this access through prices which average more than double world market prices on sales 
to the E.U., and prices which average 80 percent more than the world market prices for 
sales to the U.S. However, the value of the preferential access is less than it appears, 
because many of these producers have high production costs and would not produce at 
world market prices. Further, world market prices would rise by an estimated 38 percent 
after full liberalization which would partially offset the loss of high prices in preferential 
markets for producers. Borrell and Pearce estimate the net loss to these exporting 
countries from full liberalization at $0.45 billion. The cost to the E.U. and U.S. of 
providing each $1 of preferential access is estimated to be more than $5. In a recent study 
of the Fijian economy (Levantis, et. al, 2003), alternative forms of aid were found to 
deliver much greater economic benefit and higher growth paths. However, the removal of 
sugar subsidies would lead to considerable structural change with the rural poor incurring 
the bulk of the burden of adjustment. The study concludes that Fiji would best be served 
by a gradual process of removal of trade preferences to give sufficient time for measures 
to be implemented and labor force adjustments to occur to avert a crisis in rural unskilled 
employment. 
In an effort to further understand the effects of global sugar policy reform, a 
global computable general equilibrium (CGE) LINKAGE Model was used which 
modeled the tariff rate quota systems in OECD countries using mixed-complementary-
problem programming (van der Mensbrugghe, Beghin, and Mitchell, 2003). The model 
divides the world into 16 countries/regions and incorporates 22 sectors, including a 
combined raw and refined sugar sector. A number of liberalization scenarios were run, 
including a full multilateral sugar trade liberalization. The results generated by a 
comparative-static version of the model, show that the sugar trade policies of the 
European Union, Japan, and the United States create substantial trade diversion which 
exclude many low-cost producers from trading opportunities. An expansion of the import 
quotas of these countries/regions, without multilateral trade liberalization, preserves most 
of the trade diversion patterns and would favor African exporters relative to more 
efficient producers such as Brazil. Even a 33 percent tariff cut or quota expansion by the 
European Union, Japan and the United States would not induce great changes in 
production or income-generating opportunities for sugar exporters.  
A multilateral reform which reduces tariffs by 33 percent in all countries along 
with a 33 percent increase in TRQ quotas and a 33 percent reduction in out-of-quota 
tariffs in the EU, Japan and the U.S. generates global welfare gains of $1.3 billion and 
induce production and trade expansion in the least-cost producers (Brazil, Thailand, 
Australia-New Zealand, and the Rest of Latin and Central America). It also causes output 
to contract in countries favored by the current policies of the European Union and United 
States that are not truly competitive without preferential trade. The global welfare gains 
of full multilateral liberalization would total about $3 billion, with the largest gains going 
to the liberalizing countries, and efficient exporters. The reforming countries gain by 
reducing inefficiencies in both consumption and production.  
While the benefits to reform are not widely disputed, the opposition to reform 
within certain countries has been strong. In the remainder of this section, the sugar 
policies of the E.U., Japan, and the United States are examined and the prospects for   28
reform are examined. Recent trends and expected changes in these countries/region 




The European Union’s sugar policy uses production quotas, import controls, and 
export refunds (subsidies) to support producer prices at levels which are well above 
international prices. The program is financed primarily by E.U. consumers who pay 
higher than world market prices. The sugar policy began in 1965, as part of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which dates to 1958.
8 Under the CAP, an intervention price is 
set for each commodity as a guaranteed minimum price for farmers. If prices fall below 
this intervention price, then the European Union buys the commodity and stores it until 
the Commission decides to sell it domestically or export it. These prices vary by country 
to allow transportation costs between surplus and deficit areas. Intervention sugar prices 
have been constant in nominal terms since 1984/85; however, they vary by exchange rate 
movements when expressed in U.S. dollars (Figure 4). As shown, they have been more 
than double world market prices during most of the past 20 years. Some countries (Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) have also been allowed to pay national aid to sugar producers which 
further encourages production. Import duties are used to prevent lower priced imports 
from the world market, and export refunds are paid to exporters to cover the gap between 
the E.U. price and the generally lower world market prices when commodities are sold 
from intervention stocks. The basic market support system for sugar remains much the 


















                                                 
8 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was agreed to at the Stresa conference in July 1958. The CAP 
established a common pricing system for all farmers in the EEC, and fixed agricultural prices above world 
market levels to protect farmers in member countries who generally had higher production costs than other 
world market producers. Commodities covered by the CAP included cereals, beef, butter and skimmed 
milk powder, fruits and vegetables, and olive oil. Sugar was included in 1968 and E.U. sugar policy has 
remained largely unchanged since the original system was established.  
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Production quotas are used to limit sugar eligible for price support. Quotas are 
divided into A and B with different levels of price support. Sugar production in excess of 
quota is classed as C sugar, and is not supported but can be carried over for use as quota 
sugar in the next years or else it must be exported at world market prices. The total of A 
and B quota sugar was 14.592 million tons in 2000/01, of which 11.983 million tons was 
for A quota and 2.611 million tons was for B quota (Agra Europe, 2001). The quotas 
have been declining in order to meet WTO commitments, and the combined A and B 
quota for 2003/04 is 13.449 million tons. The surplus of A and B quota sugar above 
domestic consumption is about 1.5 million tons which is exported with subsidy. Excess 
quota or C sugar, averaged 1.59 million tons (white equivalent) between 1995/96 and 
2000/01. Thus, the E.U. sugar program results in about 3.1 million tons of sugar exports 
per year (about 10 percent of world exports), and half of this is subsidized.
9 Critics of 
E.U. policy charge that A and B quota sugar is subsidizing the production and export of C  
sugar and Brazil, Australia, and Thailand have filed a complaint with the WTO to that 
effect. Poonyth, et al. (2000) found that E.U. sugar producers respond to world sugar 
prices, even though E.U. sugar intervention prices are well above world prices. This 
supports the argument that A and B quota sugar is used to pay farmer’s fixed costs while 
sugar produced for the world market need only cover variable costs. 
Production levies are applied to all quota sugar production to cover the costs of 
export refunds. The levy on A quota is 2 percent and the levy on B quota sugar varies 
from 30 to 37 percent depending on world market prices. An additional levy can be 
collected in the next marketing year to recover any shortfall in export refunds. Quotas are 
also set for alternative sweeteners; isoglucos (know as high-fructose corn syrup in the 
U.S.) and inulin (produced from chicory and Jerusalem artichoke). The quota for 
production of HFCS is 303,000 tons and the quota for inulin is 323,000 tons. Quotas can 
be reduced temporarily to meet WTO export limits or reduced permanently by the 
European Commission.  
The high sugar prices have limited E.U. consumption growth and led to growing 
exports of quota and non-quota sugar. In the early 1970s, the E.U. was a net importer of 
about 2.5 million tons of sugar compared to net exports of about 5 million tons in recent 














                                                 
9 An additional 1.8 million tons of sugar is imported under the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol and re-exported 
with subsidy after processing. 
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The Uruguay Round commitments which came into force on July 1, 1995, had 
little initial impact on the E.U.’s sugar regime. The variable import levy was replaced by 
a fixed duty plus the safeguard clause allowing for a variable additional duty with 
minimal impact on protection to sugar beet producers. The E.U. agreed to reduce both the 
amount spent on export refunds and the volume of sugar exported with subsidy. Export 
refunds are also payable on sugar exported in the form of processed goods such as sugar 
confectionery, chocolate, biscuits, cakes, ice cream, soft drinks, etc. The E.U. amended 
legislation to allow changes in sugar production quotas on an annual basis (rather than the 
previous five-year basis) to ensure that the limits on exports were met. The limits on 
expenditures and volumes were phased in from 1995 to 2000/01. The commitment is to 
reduce only the subsidized exports net of preferential imports. This is a small proportion 
of total exports of 5 million tons, and amounted to only .34 million tons from the 1986-90 
base of 1.612 million tons per year. The E.U.’s Uruguay Round commitment was altered 
by the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. 
Preferential access to the European Union’s sugar market and its high prices have 
been used as development assistance since the 46 countries from Africa, the Caribbean, 
and the Pacific (ACP) signed the first Lomé Convention in 1975 and became eligible to 
sell sugar to the E.U. at internal prices. The Sugar Protocol (SP) of the Lomé Convention 
provided for imports of specified quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, which originate 
in the ACP states at guaranteed prices. Unlike most Articles of the Lomé Convention, the 
Sugar Protocol does not expire and cannot be changed unilaterally. The original 
quantities specified were 1,294,700 tons of white sugar equivalent, and an additional 
amount was allotted to India (see Table 6). The total import commitment was for 
1,304,700 tons and this amount has remained constant with reallocation of quotas among 
existing members when a country did not fulfill its quota. The sugar imported under the 
Lomé Convention is know as ‘Preference Sugar’ or ‘SP’ sugar. An additional import 
allocation was made of between 200,000 and 350,000 tons of sugar to primarily ACP 
countries in 1995. This sugar was called ‘Special Preference Sugar’ or ‘SPS’ sugar, but 
unlike SP sugar, this allocation was not permanent, the quantity could vary based on 
import needs, and the price paid for SPS sugar was 85 percent of the SP guaranteed price. 
In addition, the E.U. took over the WTO import commitments of the new members 
joining the E.U. in 1995. These included a tariff quota of 85,500 tons, mainly from 
Brazil, with a within quota tariff rate of 98 ECU per ton. The E.U. has also granted 
several countries in the Balkans temporary access to its sugar market and imports under 
this program totaled about 100,000 tons in 2001/02. In total, the E.U. permanent 
commitment is 1.39 million tons (white sugar equivalent) plus additional quantities of up 
to 450,000 tons of temporary imports. This commitment was expanded by unspecified 
amounts by the Everything But Arms initiative (EBA) in 2001.  
The EBA initiative allows duty-free access to the E.U. sugar market to the 48 
least developed countries (39 are ACP countries), and could become the largest of the 
E.U.’s commitments (see Appendix Box 1 for a description of the Initiative). Initially 
EBA imports will be limited by quotas, and the sugar imported under the EBA agreement 
will be counted against the SPS sugar quota. The EBA quota will increase annually until 
full duty-free access for white and raw sugar is allowed in 2009. There are safeguard 
clauses in the EBA initiative which could be used to limit imports, but this would be 
difficult for the E.U. to impose because it would be seen as a policy reversal by the least   31
developed countries. The imported sugar will eventually displace domestic E.U. 
production and could severely strain the E.U. sugar regime. The European Commission 
(2000) estimated the possible impact of the EBA on the E.U. sugar regime, and 
concluded that sugar imports could increase by an additional 2.4 million tons and cost the 
E.U. budget about 1.05 billion euros. These imports would have to be offset by reduced 
domestic production quotas or be used in non-food programs such as Ethanol. 
An additional longer-term threat to the E.U. sugar program is a Commission plan 
to offer, all 77 ACP countries the same conditions as the EBA countries under the 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Negotiations began in September 2002 and 
are expected to take 5 years. Under the Agreements, all ACP countries would have duty-
free access to the E.U. market for all goods except arms. These countries currently 
produce 6.2 million tons of sugar (F.O. Licht, 2002, page 443) and they could provide all 
of it to the E.U. at short notice while covering their own demand from the world market. 
Taken together, EBA and ACP supplies could total 8.6 million tons. This is 60 percent of 
current E.U. production, and would force major change to the E.U. sugar program. 
However, the program would likely be phased in over a number of years beginning in 
2008.  
 
Table 6. E.U. Preferential Sugar Quotas to ACP Countries and India. 
Country  1975/76-76/77 1984/85-85/86 1995/96-99/00 
  (tons white sugar equivalent) 
  
Barbados 49,300 50,049 50,312 
Belice 39,400 40,104 40,349 
Congo 10,000 10,000 10.186 
Côte d’Ivoire  10,000 10,186 
Fiji 163,600 164,862 165,348 
Guyana 157,700 158,935 159,410 
India 25,000 10,000 10,000 
Jamaica 118,300 118,300 118,696 
Kenya 5,000 5,000 0 
Madagascar 10,000 10,573 10,760 
Malawi 20,000 20,618 20,824 
Mauritius 487,200 489,914 491,031 
St.Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla 14,800  
St. Christopher/Nevis  15,394 15,591 
Surinam 4,000 0 0 
Swaziland 116,400 117,450 117,845 
Tanzania 10,000 10,000 10,186 
Trinidad & Tobago  69,000 43,500 43,751 
Uganda 5,000  
Zimbabwe 30,000 30,225 
Total 1,304,700 1,304,700 1,304,700 
Source: European Commission. 
 
  The E.U. does not have a biofuel program, but individual member countries do. 
The dependence of the E.U. on imports for half of its energy use and the environmental 
advantages makes biofuels an attractive option for the E.U. and provides a possible outlet   32
for surplus sugar production. At present, biofuels account for 0.2 to 0.3 percent of E.U. 
fuel use from national programs in France, Spain, and Sweden. France is the European 
leader in bioethanol production, which is converted into ethyl tertiary butyl ether (ETBE) 
and blended with gasoline in concentrations of up to 15 percent for use without 
modification in vehicle engines. About 70 percent of the ethanol produced for ETBE 
comes from sugar beets and the remainder comes from grains. The support to ethanol 
dates to 1992 when ethanol in France was partially exempt from the tax on petroleum 
products. The tax rate for unleaded petrol in France was FRF284.23 per hl, while the tax 
rate for biothanol was FRF54.37, giving a tax concession of FRF229.50. (F.O. Lichts, 
November 23, 2001, p552). An E.U. biofuel program was proposed  in November 2001. 
The proposal calls for biofuels and other substitute fuels to account for 20 percent of total 
fuel consumption by 2020, with an increasing requirement from 2005. Biofuels would be 
required to account for 2 percent of fuel use in the transportation sector and reach 8 
percent by 2020. Tax incentives would be decided by member states. 
E.U. enlargement may create new problems for the E.U. sugar regime. Most of 
the countries scheduled to join the EU are sugar producers and expect the same level of 
support as currently received by E.U. sugar producers. The ten countries scheduled to 
join in mid-2004 are: Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania will likely 
join shortly thereafter, and the last of the current round of accession countries, Turkey, 
will probably join several years later. Poland is the largest sugar producer of the ten 
countries scheduled to join in 2004, with nearly a 60 percent of the group’s total 
production. The first ten accession countries are shown in Table 7 as AC-10 and the sugar 
sectors of these countries are compared with the sugar sector in the E.U. These countries  
 



























 Average  1995-2000 
AC-10  37.6  0.6    24.3  16.0    3.6    3.3  43.3  -0.2 
AC-12  35.0  0.7    26.2  15.8    3.8    3.8  38.0  0.4 
AC-13  36.7  1.1    42.7  14.6    5.9    5.9  35.2  0.3 
EU-15 56.8  2.1  115.0  18.3  17.6  13.9  37.1  -4.2 
                
  Accession Group as Percent of EU-15 
AC-10 66.2 31.2  21.1  87.6  20.2  23.3  116.6    3.6 
AC-12 61.7 36.1  22.8  86.3  21.4  27.1  102.5  -10.2 
AC-13 64.6 56.5  37.2  79.7  33.5  42.3    94.7    -6.9 
                
Source: Based on FAOSTAT data. 
 
produce about one-fifth as much sugar as the E.U., have higher per capita consumption, 
lower yields, and lower recovery rates than the E.U. They agreed to an A and B quota of 
2.958 million tons, with 2.829 million tons of A quota and .129 million tons of B quotas 
(EU Commission, 2003). They also agreed to an isoglucos quota of .206 million tons.   33
Producers will likely also produce C  sugar, as is done by current E.U. producers, to 
ensure that they have adequate production to fill their quotas and to export at world 
market prices. Further adjustments will be needed when Bulgaria and Romania join the 
E.U. (AC-12), and when Turkey joins (AC-13) since it is a large sugar producer. 
  A 1998 E.U. Commission study of the 10 accession countries concluded that the 
group would add at least 200,000 tons to the E.U.’s export surplus. This was supported 
by an analysis of the exports of the 10 accession countries, that would have occurred 
from 1998-2000 if these countries had already joined the E.U. This analysis found that 
E.U. exports would have been 210,000 to 230,000 tons larger due to the accession 
countries. The data in Table 7 shows similar results, that accession countries’ production 
exceeds consumption by about 300,000 tons. Among the unknowns, are the response of 
consumers in the accession countries to the expected increase in sugar prices once they 
join the E.U. According to F.O. Licht, retail sugar prices in the accession countries 
ranged from 0.48 to 0.68 Euros per kilogram compared to 0.80 in the EU-15. This would 
cause consumption to drop by roughly 4-8 percent if prices were equalized and that 
would increase the production surplus by about 120,000-240,000 tons. Thus, it seems 
likely that the accession countries will add to the exports of the E.U. by about 200,000 
tons. 
Pressures for change to the E.U. sugar regime come from a number of sources. 
Processed food manufactures would like to see reduced sugar prices because they find it 
difficult to export products containing sugar due to WTO limits on subsidized exports. 
Sugar exporters, such as Australia and Brazil, would like to see exports reduced because 
they contend that they depress world prices, and reduce export opportunities. 
Enlargement adds new pressure because it could add to surplus sugar production, which 
cannot be exported with subsidy because of WTO commitments. The potential increase 
in imports under the EBA initiative could force sharp declines in production quotas or 
intervention prices, and the Economic Partnership Agreements cannot be accommodated 
without major changes to the E.U. sugar program. However, efforts at reform also face 
numerous obstacles. If intervention prices are reduced, E.U. sugar producers would likely 
expect compensation and this would violate the Agenda 2000 budget agreement. Lower 
intervention prices would also affect ACP countries that currently supply sugar to the 
E.U. on preferential terms, and prompt requests for new forms of development assistance. 
Reductions in quotas will be opposed by E.U. sugar producers. The problem will become 
more acute over the next decade as new countries join the E.U. and EBA imports 
increase.  
The current E.U. sugar regime runs until June 2006, and the European 
Commission opened discussions on reform to the E.U. sugar regime on September 23, 
2003. However, unlike the other commodities scheduled for reform discussions; cotton, 
olive oil and tobacco, reform proposals were not offered for sugar. Rather, three scenarios 
for reform were offered, which ranged from an extension of the present sugar regime 
beyond 2006 to complete liberalization of the present regime. Complicating the reform 
discussions is the WTO investigatory probe launched on August 29, 2003, in response to 
complaints by Brazil, Australia and Thailand that the E.U. sugar regime illegally 
subsidizes the industry and depresses world prices. The WTO challenge alleges breaches 
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement and GATT 1994, and thus the proceedings will be subject to accelerated   34
review. In addition, a negative finding by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would be 
liable to swift implementation, i.e. “withdrawal of subsidies without delay.” Further, 
Brazil and Australia have declared that they reserve their right to raise other claims and 
factural and legal issues during the consultation. This could threaten the waiver which the 
ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement was given in November 2001 by the 4
th WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha according to F.O. Lichts (F.O. Lichts International Sugar and 




Japan is the third largest net sugar importer, following Russia and Indonesia, with 
average annual net imports of about 1.6 million tons of raw sugar during 1999-2001 
(Figure 6). Imports supply about two-thirds of domestic sugar consumption and the 
remaining one-third is supplied by highly subsidized beet and cane producers. 
Domestically produced HFCS accounts for about 40 percent of total caloric sweeteners. 
Sugar beet production is concentrated on the island of Hokkaido, and sugar cane is grown 
on the smaller southern islands. The government intervenes in the sugar market by 
establishing guaranteed minimum prices for sugar beets and cane, controls on raw sugar 
imports, prohibitive duties on refined sugar imports, high tariffs on imported products 
containing sugar, and quotas, tariffs and other controls on sugar substitutes. The system 
results in retail sugar prices which are among the highest in the world ($.89 per pound in 
Tokyo in 2000) and producer prices for sugar beets and sugar cane which are roughly 10 
times world market levels. Sugar consumption is gradually declining due to competition 
from HFCS, high sugar prices, slow economic growth, and dietary changes away from 
sweeteners. However consumption may actually be higher than reported because sugar 
contained in imported products is not reported and is estimated to account for as much as 


































































Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) sets guaranteed 
minimum prices for sugar cane and sugar beets according to the Sugar Price Stabilization 
Law of 1965 and the Revised Sugar Price Adjustment Law of 2000 (Fukuda, Dyck and 
Stout, 2002). The minimum producer prices are set based on a formula comparing current 
agricultural input prices and consumer goods relative to prices that prevailed in 1950 and 
1951. The minimum producer price for sugar beets during 1990-95 averaged $149/ton 
while the minimum producer price for sugar cane was $174 per ton. By comparison, U.S. 
sugar beet and cane producers received an average of $29/ton and $40/tons, respectively, 
during the same period (USDA). U.S. producers receive prices which are more than 
double world market prices, and thus, Japanese beet and cane producers received at least 
10 times world market prices.
10 For the 2001 marketing year, the minimum price for 
sugar beets was 17,040 yen/ton ($131/ton) and 20,370 yen/ton for sugar cane ($157/ton). 
Australian sugar cane producers, who receive no government price supports, received 
$16/ton in the 2001 marketing year (Sheales, 2002). The MAFF also sets the raw sugar 
price for domestic refiners, known as the “domestic sugar rationalization target price”, at 
a level intended to allow restructured sugar refining firms to pay the guaranteed 
minimum price to sugar cane and beet producers and still recover costs. A subsidy is 
provided to sugar refiners to cover the difference between the domestic market price and 
the “target price”. In marketing year 2001, the target price for raw sugar was 151,800 yen 
per ton ($1,168 per ton or $.53 pound) while the resale price on imported raw cane sugar 
was about $.22 per pound (Fukuda, et. al, 2002, page 7). The difference was made up by 
a subsidy provided by a surcharge on imported sugar, other surcharges, and funds from 
Japan’s national budget. The current subsidy to refiners is 90 billion yen ($692 million) 
according to the MAFF (Fukuda, et. al, 2002, page 3).  
The government regulates the production and price of HFCS in order to limit 
competition with sugar and obtain funds to partially pay for the high support to sugar beet 
and cane producers. HFCS production targets are established by the MAFF for each 
producer and a surcharge is paid to the government on production up to that level. An 
additional surcharge is added on production which exceeds targets, which effectively 
establishes production quotas on HFCS and prevents the balance between sugar and 
HFCS from changing. HFCS producers are required to use a minimum share of 
domestically produced potatoes and sweet potatoes in addition to imported maize. In 
addition to controlling HFCS production and prices, high tariffs are imposed on imported 
HFCS and tariff-rate quotas are imposed on starch imports. Food manufactures are 
prevented from circumventing the high barriers to imports of sugar and HFCS by higher 
tariffs on intermediate or final products that contain added sugar. Partly as a result of high 
sugar prices, some food manufactures have moved offshore so that finished products 
containing sugar can be imported at lower overall tariffs than the raw sugar.  
Full liberalization of Japan’s sugar and sweetener market would likely reduce 
domestic sugar production drastically—perhaps completely eliminating domestic 
production. Consumption would increase as consumers faced lower sugar prices and 
imports would increase to meet consumer demand. HFCS consumption would likely 
                                                 
10 There appears to be an anomaly between the OECD’s estimate of producer support in Table 3 and the 
prices received by sugar beet and sugar cane producers in Japan. If  sugar beet and cane producers in Japan 
receive five times the prices in the U.S., then it appears the PSE percentage should be higher rather than 
lower as reported in Table 3.   36
increase without current controls, but would not necessarily increase under full 
liberalization of the sugar and sweetener markets because of competition from imported 
sugar. The Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics (ABARE) 
estimated in a 1999 study that sugar imports would rise by 500,000 tons if Japan 
eliminated its tariffs, surcharges and levies on sugar imports. The study assumed that 
domestic production would only decline 22 percent because of other means of 
government support. The Economic Research Service of USDA estimated that 
production would decline by 40 percent if Japan were to eliminated all border protection 
and domestic support which is trade distorting. Consumer and producer prices in Japan 
would fall by 70 percent under their scenario, and imports would rise by as much as 
735,000 tons (Fukuda, et al. 2002, page 8). Borrell and Pearce (1999) estimated that 
sugar prices would decline by 65 percent, production would decline by 44 percent, and 
net imports would increase by about 1.5 million tons. 
 
U.S. Sugar Policy 
 
U.S. sugar policy began with the Sugar Act of 1934, when sugar was first 
included as a basic agricultural commodity under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The 
sugar policy was in response to declining sugar prices following a surge in domestic 
sugar production and imports, and a decline in consumption due to the Great Depression 
(USDA, 1935). At that time, 89 percent of U.S. sugar production was from sugar beets 
and only 11 percent was from sugar cane. Thus, the act was mostly designed to protect 
sugar beet producers from falling prices. Imports accounted for 77 percent of total sugar 
consumption. The basic provisions of the 1934 Sugar Act remained in effect through 
subsequent legislation until 1974, when the Sugar Act was not renewed because of high 
world market prices (Lord, 1995). World prices soon fell, and sugar policy resumed when 
sugar was included in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. The 1977 legislation 
provided for government loan rates for sugar beets and cane.
11 The 1981 Act mandated a 
raw cane sugar loan rate of 18 cents per pound by 1985. Subsequent legislation, including 
the most recent 2002 farm legislation, maintained the sugar program in much the same 
form as in the 1981 Act. A Refined Sugar Re-export Program was introduced in 1983 that 
allowed sugar cane refiners to purchase raw sugar at world prices, without duty, and 
export a like amount within 90 days. A similar program was created for manufacturers of 
sugar-containing products. In the 1985 Act, a no-cost provision was added that required 
the Secretary of Agriculture to make every effort to operate the sugar program in a way 
which avoided forfeiture under the loan program. In order to avoid forfeitures, it was 
necessary to keep the domestic sugar price above the world market price. This was done 
by restricting sugar imports, first by quotas introduced in May 1982, and then by tariff-
rate quotas in 1990 following a successful GATT challenge. Import duties of 0.625 per 
pound, raw value, were charged for countries granted Most-Favored Nation status by the 
                                                 
11 Non-recourse commodity loans are used by the government to support prices of many crops. Under the 
program, farmers who comply with the provisions of each commodity program are allowed to pledge their 
commodity as collateral and obtain a loan from the USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) at the 
specified loan rate per unit for the commodity. The borrower may elect to repay the loan with interest 
within a specified period and regain control of the commodity, or default on the loan as payment of the loan 
and interest. The farmer will normally default on the loan if the market price is below the level necessary to 
repay the loan and interest. Thus, the loan rate becomes the effective floor price.   37
United States, but most quota suppliers were exempt through the Generalized System of 
Preferences or the Caribbean Basin Initiative.  
The 1990 legislation established minimum import levels to allay concerns of 
quota-holding countries and cane processors. It also provided for marketing allotments on 
domestically produced sugar if estimated imports were less than 1.25 million tons, raw 
value. The 1990 legislation did not change the loan rates, but it provided for an 
assessment on all sugar processed of 0.18 cents per pound of raw cane sugar and 0.193 
cents per pound of refined beet sugar in an effort to ‘effectively’ reduce the loan rates. 
Marketing allotments were introduced in 1990 on domestically produced sugar if 
estimated sugar imports were less than 1.25 million tons, raw value. The allotment can be 
imposed at the discretion of the Secretary of Agriculture and are to be allocated between 
beet and cane producers based on past marketing, processing and refining capacity, and 
ability to market. Marketing allotments were imposed in fiscal 1993 and 1995, but have 
been controversial and subjected to legal challenges.  
The 2002 legislation changed the marketing allotments program to allow the 
Secretary of Agriculture to impose marketing allotments in order to balance markets, 
avoid forfeitures, and comply with import commitments under WTO and NAFTA. The 
allotments can only be used when sugar imports, excluding imports under the re-export 
program, are less than 1.532 million tons.
12 A sugar Payment-in-Kind (PIK) program was 
used in 2000 and 2001 to reduce CCC inventories in exchange for farmers not harvesting 
planted acreage. The program allowed produces to bid for the amount of CCC inventory 
they would accept in exchange for forgoing harvest of a farmers-specified number of 
planted acres. This program is extended in the 2002 legislation and includes a product-
for-production, pre-planting crop diversion program. The USDA has used the new 
authority provided by the 2002 legislation and announced flexible marketing allotments 
for sugar for the 2002/03 marketing year (Haley and Suarez, 2002). The USDA is 
required to adjust allotment quantities to avoid forfeiture of sugar to the CCC. 
  The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 continues the essential 
elements of the previous sugar program, but with some changes which increase support to 
sugar producers and processors. The non-recourse loan program is reauthorized through 
FY 2007 at 18 cents per pound for raw cane sugar and 22.9 cents per pound for refined 
beet sugar. The Act continues to require the USDA to operate the sugar program, to the 
maximum extent possible, at no cost to the government by avoiding forfeiture to the CCC 
under the loan program. Program changes which benefit the sugar industry include: the 
termination of the marketing assessment on all sugar processed (between 1.375 and 1.47 
percent of the raw sugar loan rate), the termination of the forfeiture penalty on cane 
($0.01 per pound) and beet processors ($0.0107 per pound), and reduced interest rate on 
CCC sugar loans by one percentage point. The payment-in-kind (PIK) program was 
continued. An inventory management authority was provided to the Secretary of 
Agriculture to impose marketing allotments in order to balance markets, avoid forfeitures 
and comply with the U.S. sugar import commitments under WTO and NAFTA. The 
tariff-rate-quotas are continued under the 2002 Act.  
                                                 
12 This seems the opposite of what is required, but the logic is apparently that if imports exceed this amount 
then the sugar program has lost its ability to control imports and U.S. producers should be given 
unrestricted freedom to produce.   38
  In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the United States agreed to 
maintain minimum imports of 1.139 million metric tons of raw value sugar imports 
(1.256 short tons). Of this, 22,000 metric tons was reserved for refined sugar. The raw 
cane sugar tariff-rate quota (TRQ) was allocated to 40 quota holding countries based on 
their export shares during 1975-81 when trade was relatively unrestricted. The duty of 
0.625 cents per pound, raw value, continues on quota imports. Most countries continue to 
avoid the duty because of GSP or CBI programs. The duty on raw sugar above the tariff-
rate quota was 17.62 cents per pound beginning in January 1995 and lowered by 0.45 
cents per pound each year until it reached 15.36 cents per pound in 2000. The refined 
sugar above rate tariff was 18.62 cents per pound in 1995 and declined by 0.48 per year 
through 2000 to 16.21 cents per pound. The over-quota tariff will remain prohibitive at a 
world price of about 5 cents per pound (assuming a U.S. raw sugar market price of 22 
cents per pound and a transportation price of 1.5 cents per pound).  
  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) became effective on 
January 1, 1994, and most trade barriers between Canada, Mexico, and the United States 
are eliminated over the subsequent 15 years (Polopolus, Alvarez, and Messina 2002). The 
NAFTA sugar provisions were altered by a side-letter agreement prior to the start of the 
NAFTA Agreement. According to the NAFTA side-letter, Mexico’s low-tier tariff sugar 
exports to the United States are restricted by Mexico’s ‘net surplus production’ of sugar. 
The net surplus is defined as Mexico’s production less consumption of sugar and high-
fructose corn syrup. From FY 2001 through 2007, Mexico is to have duty-free access to 
the U.S. market for the amount of its surplus, up to a maximum of 250,000 metric tons 
raw value. Beginning in FY 2008, Mexico is to have duty-free access with no quantitative 
limit. The validity of the side-letter agreement is disputed by the Mexicans, while the 
United States maintains that the side-letter provisions are valid. Starting with the 2000/01 
sugar crop and continuing through the 2007/08 sugar crop, Mexico can export up to 
250,000 tons of surplus sugar duty-free to the U.S. In 2001/02, Mexico shipped 148,000 
tons of sugar, and other exporter’s quotas were reduced to accommodate the larger 
quantities. The question arises as to how future increases in Mexico’s exports will be 
accommodated. And, how will unlimited duty-free access be accommodated in 2008/09? 
Table 8 shows current U.S. sugar import quotas. The countries with the largest quotas, 
and therefore the most to lose, are Brazil, Dominican Republic and Philippines.  
  The side-letter agreement did not change other NAFTA provisions such as the 
phased reduction in the U.S. over-quota tariff of 16 cents per pound by a total of 15 
percent during the first 6 years, and then in a straight line to zero in calendar year 2008. 
The raw sugar over-quota tariff was 9.07 cents per pound in 2002 and it drops about 1.5 
cents per pound each year.  For example, if the world raw sugar prices is in the range of  
7 cents per pound and U.S. raw sugar prices are about 18 cents per pound, Mexican 
producers would benefit from exporting to the U.S. instead of the world market (USDA, 
2002). Currently, Mexico does not have a large surplus of sugar to export but this could 
change due to increased production or reduced sugar consumption from imports or 
production of HFCS (which currently has a 20 percent import duty). In future years, the 
over-quota tariff will continue to decrease and could lead to large imports. A provision of 
the U.S. sugar legislation removes production quotas if imports exceed 1.5 million tons—
a free-for-all if imports increase beyond certain limits. Under this alternative, the U.S. 
government could end up holding large stocks defaulted under the sugar loan program    39
Table 8.  U.S. Sugar Import Quotas and Fill Rates 
Country 1982/83 1990/91 2000/01
 Metric  Tons 
Argentina 109,226 85,655 45,283
Australia 210,832 168,837 87,408
Barbados 17,781 14,239 7,372
Belize 27,942 22,376 11,584
Bolivia 20,321 16,273 8,425
Brazil 368,321 294,956 152,700
Canada 27,942
Colombia 60,963 48,882 25,274
Congo n.a. 8,030 7,258
Costa Rica  38,102 30,513 15,797
Côte d’Ivoire  14,969 8,030 7,258
Dominican Republic  447,065 358,013 185,346
Ecuador 27,942 22,376 11,584
El Salvador  66,044 52,889 27,381
Fiji 17,781 18,307 9,478
Gabon n.a. 8,030 7,258
Guatemala 121,927 97,641 50,549
Guyana 30,482 24,410 12,637
Haiti 14,969 8,030 7,258
Honduras 25,401 20,342 10,531
India 20,321 16,273 8,425
Jamaica 27,942 22,376 11,584
Madagascar 14,969 8,030 7,258
Malawi 17,781 20,342 10,531
Mauritius 27,942 24,410 12,637
Mexico 14,969 8,030 7,258
Mozambique 33,022 26,445 13,690
Nicaragua 53,343 42,717 22,115
Panama 73,664 58,991 30,540
Papua New Guinea  n.a. 8,030 7,258
Paraguay 14,969 8,030 7,258
Peru 104,146 83,402 43,177
Philippines 342,919 321,401 142,169
St. Kitts-Nevis  7,258
St. Christopher-Nevis  14,969 8,030
South Africa  58,423 0 24,221
Swaziland 40,642 32,547 16,850
Taiwan 30,482 24,410 12,637
Thailand 35,562 28,479 14,743
Trinidad-Tobago 17,781 14,239 7,372
Uruguay n.a. 8,030 7,258
Zimbabwe 30,482 24,410 12,637
Total 2,624,150 2,100,083 1,389,997
 







Source: USDA.   40
and the sugar system would become more difficult to manage because of the non-net cost 
provision of the 2002 Farm Bill. Mexico has increased sugar production from about 3.5 
million tons during 1989-91 to 5.2 million during 2000-02, while consumption 
hasincreased from 4.0 to 4.5 million tons (USDA). Following the end of the NAFTA 
phase-in period, Mexico can ship unlimited quantities of sugar to the U.S. duty-free 
without the condition of being a net surplus producer. This could lead to various 
outcomes, and will likely force changes to the U.S. sugar program. For example, Mexico 
could increase imports of HFCS for use in the soft drink industry which then frees sugar 
to export to the U.S. 
The effectiveness of the U.S.’s sugar program at keeping domestic prices above 
world prices can be seen in Figure 7. During this period, world prices have fallen sharply, 
but U.S. producers were protected. However, the sugar program faces new challenges in 
the near future which could bring into conflict the no-cost provision of the sugar 
program, the minimum import commitment under the WTO, and the duty-free access 
provision to Mexican imports in FY 2008. The more rapid growth of sweetener 
production compared to consumption could also destabilize the program. The growth rate 
of sweetener production during 1985-2000 was 3.2 percent compared with the growth of 
consumption of 2.1 percent over the same period. If these growth rates are extended to 
2010 (Figure 8), the imbalance between production and consumption becomes significant 
and marketing allotments would be needed to prevent stock building. The problem is 
further exacerbated by the Uruguay Round Agreement to import 1.139 million tons of 
sugar, raw value, per year. The U.S. sugar program, like that of the E.U. almost certainly 
will have to change.  
The U.S. sugar program benefits just 9,000 sugar beet producers and 1,000 sugar 
cane producers (Orden 2003). However, opposition to policy reform is strong, especially 
from sugar cane producers. Florida accounts for one-quarter of U.S. sugar production and 
two large corporations account for nearly 80 percent of the cane acreage in Florida. Such 
concentration of production suggests that reforming the U.S. sugar program will likely 
require compensation of existing producers, and a model to consider is the recent reform 
of the U.S. edible peanut program (Orden, 2003). Like sugar, the edible peanut program 
had domestic prices supported at about double world prices, quotas to limit production, 
and TRQs to limit imports (Diop, Beghin and Sewadeh, 2003). And, like sugar, the edible 
peanut program faced the threat of increased imports due to WTO and NAFTA 
agreements. In the 2002 U.S. farm bill, the loan rate for edible peanuts was cut by half 
compared to the mid-1990s, production quotas were eliminated and direct cash payments 
were made to producers. The payments consisted of deficiency payments if prices fell 
below the new lower loan rates, decoupled direct payments, and counter-cyclical 
payments. In addition, quota holders were compensated for their loss of quota rights with 
direct payments. A similar program for sugar would be complicated by the loss of 
benefits of HFCS producers who benefit from high sugar prices. However, reform of the 
sugar program may also require compensating the industries which now depend on 






























VI.   Summary and Conclusions 
 
Sugar cane is an almost ideal commodity for some developing countries to grow 
for domestic consumption and export. It can be produced efficiently in tropical climates 
under a wide range of technologies from low-input labor-intensive to high-input fully-
mechanized. Sugar is locally consumed in all producing countries, and provides a 
substantial part of total calories in many countries. Processing can be varied to meet the 
needs of low-income domestic or high-income foreign consumers. Raw cane sugar stores 
well after initial processing. There are few problems in meeting sanitary and health 
standards because sugar cane juice is boiled during initial processing and raw cane sugar 
is boiled again when refined to produce white sugar. The biggest problem for producers 
of this almost ideal commodity is the limited world market export opportunities and low 
world prices, which are caused largely by policies in OECD countries. 
  The E.U., Japan, and the United States are among the worst offenders. They 
provide domestic producers with price supports that are at least double world market 
levels. Such high prices have reduced the rate of growth of domestic consumption, 
encouraged production of alternative sweeteners, and led to high production by local 
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producers who would not be competitive at world market prices. Imports have been 
limited by quotas and tariffs and surplus production has been exported with subsidies or 
disposed of at world market prices to avoid storage. The impact of such policies has been 
to depress world market prices by about one-third, according to several estimates, and 
limit the growth of imports. Such policies have converted these countries from importers 
of half of the world’s internationally traded sugar in the early 1980s to net exporters on 
balance during the past two decades. The recent Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture has done little to change the situation.  
  The reason for the high support to producers in these countries relates partly to the 
un-competitiveness of sugar beets compared to sugar cane. According to cost of 
production estimates, the average cost of producing sugar from beets is nearly twice the 
average cost of producing sugar from cane. Sugar beets account for half of U.S. sugar 
production, 80 percent of Japanese production, and nearly all of E.U. production. Without 
such support, sugar beet production would decline sharply in the E.U. and U.S. and 
probably be eliminated entirely in Japan.  
Support for current sugar policies among program beneficiaries is obviously 
strong, but problems are emerging that make change inevitable. In the E.U., WTO limits 
on subsidized exports are forcing production quotas to be reduced and food processors 
out of international markets. The enlargement of the E.U., which is scheduled to admit 10 
countries in 2004, will further strain the sugar regime as new members gear up to produce 
under high support prices. The Everything But Arms initiative allows unlimited duty-free 
access to 48 least developed countries by 2009 and could lead to sharply higher imports 
and further cuts in production quotas. A plan to offer all 77 ACP countries the same 
conditions as the EBA countries from 2008 under the Economic Partnership Agreements 
could further threaten the E.U. sugar program. A review of the E.U.’s sugar regime is 
scheduled for 2004 and this could lead to changes in the sugar regime. In Japan, sugar 
beet and sugar cane producers receive 10 times world market prices. Food manufactures 
are moving production offshore in order to avoid high sugar prices and then importing 
processed foods into Japan at lower tariff rates than for sugar. Pressures for reform are, 
however, limited. In the U.S., high sugar prices have encouraged rapid production 
increases and current trends suggest sugar stocks could begin to build almost immediately 
because of minimum import commitments made under the Uruguay Round Agreement 
on Agriculture. This conflicts with the U.S. sugar program mandate to operate under a 
no-cost provision and will force prices lower or lead to marketing allotments. By 2009, 
Mexico has unlimited duty-free sugar access to the U.S. sugar market under the NAFTA 
sugar agreement and is expected to increase exports substantially. The U.S. is currently 
negotiating a free-trade agreement with five Central American countries, and these 
countries are large sugar producers and exporters. Unless sugar is excluded from the 
agreement, this could further destabilize the U.S. sugar program.  
The benefits of sugar policy reform are substantial, and the gains are greatest 
under multilateral reform. According to recent studies of the global sugar and sweetener 
markets, the global welfare gains of removal of all trade protection are estimated to total 
as much as $4.7 billion per year. In countries with the highest protection (Japan, Western 
Europe, the U.S., Indonesia, and Eastern Europe) net imports increase by 15 million tons 
per year. World sugar prices would increase about 40 percent, while sugar prices in 
countries that heavily protect their markets would decline. The greatest price decline   43
would occur in Japan, where sugar prices would fall 65 percent, followed by a 40 percent 
decline in Western Europe, and a 25 percent decline in the United States. Brazilian 
producers gain the most from liberalization, around $2.6 billion per year, but this is offset 
by a loss of $1 billion to Brazilian consumers who pay higher prices liberalization—
leaving a net gain of $1.6 billion for Brazil.  
The exporting countries which currently have preferential access to the E.U. and 
U.S. sugar markets gain about $0.8 billion per year (compared to world market prices)   
from this access through prices which average more than double the current world market 
price on sales to the E.U., and prices which average 80 percent more than the world 
market prices for sales to the U.S. However, the value of this preferential access is less 
than it appears, because many of these producers have high production costs and would 
not produce at world market prices. Further, world market prices would rise by about 40 
percent after full liberalization which would partially offset the loss to producers of high 
prices in preferential markets. The net loss to these exporting countries from full 
liberalization is estimated to total $0.45 billion per year.  
  The nature of reforms can have very different implications for developing 
countries. If existing polices in the E.U. and U.S. are adjusted to accommodate higher 
imports from EBA and NAFTA, many low-cost producers, such as Brazil, will lose 
because they do not currently have large quotas and are not ACP, EBA, or NAFTA 
countries. A better alternative is to push for full liberalization of the world sugar market 
to allow efficient producers to expand production and exports and consumers in protected 
markets to benefit from lower prices. This also may make policy change more palatable 
because no country is being singled out for reform. It also has the advantage of somewhat 
higher world prices from coordinated liberalization to soften the adjustment for producers 
in protected markets such as the E.U., Japan, and the U.S. While change will not be easy, 
a coordinated liberalization has substantial advantages over marginal adjustments that 
keep existing sugar policies in place but allow larger imports. 
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Appendix Box 1: Everything But Arms 
 
The EU approved a Regulation extending duty-free access without any quantitative
restrictions to products originating in the least-developed countries. The Regulation,
which applies from 5 March 2001, provides for full duty-free access for the world’s 48
least developed countries (LDC) into EU markets and covers all goods except arms (and
three “sensitive” products). 
 
With respect to the three “sensitive” products (bananas, rice, and sugar), the access is
restricted during the phasing-in period: 
•  for bananas, full liberalization from 2006, 
•  for sugar, full liberalization from1 July 2009 
•  for rice, full liberalization from 1 September 2009 
•  the allocation of duty-free quotas for rice and sugar during the interim period
preceding liberalization. These quotas to be based initially on best figures for
LDC exports during the 1990s, plus 15%. They will increase by 15% each year
during the interim period 
•  implementation of the following tariff cuts during the interim period: 
bananas: annual reductions of 20% from January 2002 
sugar: 20% reduction on 1 July 2006, 50% reduction on 1 July 2007, 80% 
reduction on 1 July 2008, 
rice: 20% reduction on 1 September 2006, 50% reduction on 1 September 2007,
80% reduction on 1 September 2008. 
 
There is a safeguard clause for the sensitive products which allows the Commission to
suspend the preferences provided by the Regulations for the products concerned if the
imports of the sensitive products caused serious disturbance to the Community markets
and their regulatory mechanisms. 
 
Source: EU Council Press Release, February 26, 2001.   49
Table A1. Sugar Consumption (million tons) and Growth Rates (percent). 
  Average Consumption   Growth Rates  
 1969-71 1979-81 1989-91 1999-01   70s  80s 90s
               
World 69.31 95.63 105.31 127.10 3.3  1.0 1.9
   
Developed 34.05 35.08 30.97 30.67 0.3  -1.2 -0.1
Developing 35.26 60.55 74.33 96.42 5.6  2.1 2.6
   
OECD 35.80 37.89 35.10 35.22 0.6  -0.8 0.0
 Australia  0.71 0.79 0.85 1.00 1.0  0.8 1.6
 Canada  1.04 1.06 0.94 1.24 0.1  -1.2 2.8
 EU-15  7.37 11.15 13.32 14.40 4.2  1.8 0.8
 Japan  2.82 3.11 2.82 2.25 1.0  -1.0 -2.2
 USA  10.11 9.33 7.79 9.11 -0.8  -1.8 1.6
Asia 11.75 21.56 33.94 45.07 6.3  4.6 2.9
 China  2.20 3.83 7.45 8.68 5.7  6.9 1.5
 India  3.89 6.82 11.75 17.37 5.8  5.6 4.0
 Indonesia  0.83 1.84 2.36 3.10 8.3  2.5 2.8
 Pakistan  0.00 0.83 2.27 3.32 n.a.  10.6 3.9
 Philippines  0.67 1.16 1.41 1.92 5.7  2.0 3.1
 Thailand  0.34 0.59 1.03 1.73 5.6  5.9 5.3
Africa 2.44 7.18 8.72 11.21 11.4  2.0 2.5
North AFrica  0.79 2.77 3.58 4.46 13.4  2.6 2.2
 Egypt  0.46 1.19 1.54 1.97 9.9  2.6 2.5
 Morocco  0.32 0.67 0.81 1.01 7.5  1.9 2.3
 Iran  0.71 1.23 1.40 1.92 5.7  1.3 3.2
 Turkey  0.63 1.13 1.73 2.03 6.0  4.4 1.6
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.87 3.18 3.78 5.31 13.9  1.7 3.5
 Nigeria  0.00 0.73 0.47 0.70 n.a.  -4.3 4.2
 Ethiopia  0.08 0.15 0.16 0.41 6.0  0.5 10.2
 Kenya  0.15 0.29 0.51 0.57 6.7  5.9 1.2
 Tanzania  0.10 0.15 0.12 0.22 3.9  -1.7 6.0
 Rep. S. Africa  0.79 1.23 1.37 1.44 4.5  1.1 0.5
Eastern Europe  3.90 4.81 4.92 4.65 2.1  0.2 -0.6
 Hungary  0.44 0.55 0.53 0.41 2.3  -0.4 -2.5
 Poland  1.32 1.57 1.74 1.74 1.8  1.0 0.0
FSU   
 Russian Federation  0.00 0.00 4.65 5.99 n.a.  n.a. 2.6
 Ukraine  0.00 0.00 1.91 2.03 n.a.  n.a. 0.6
Latin America  9.87 15.35 18.14 22.75 4.5  1.7 2.3
 Argentina  0.87 1.05 0.90 1.51 1.9  -1.5 5.3
 Brazil  3.60 5.90 6.83 9.15 5.1  1.5 3.0
 Colombia  0.52 0.92 1.20 1.31 5.9  2.6 0.9
 Cuba  0.71 0.53 0.80 0.70 -2.8  4.1 -1.4
 Mexico  1.91 3.12 4.05 4.48 5.0  2.6 1.0
Source: FAOSTAT 
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Table A2. Raw Sugar Imports (million tons). 
   Average 
   1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1998-2000
    
World   15.69 18.63 17.17  21.21
    
Russian Federation  0.00 0.00 0.00  4.66
United States of America  4.57 4.20 1.76  1.64
Japan   2.21 2.15 1.77  1.55
Korea, Republic of  0.23 0.72 1.13  1.40
United Kingdom  1.95 1.14 1.21  1.26
Iran, Islamic Rep of  0.00 0.04 0.02  1.07
Canada   0.94 0.91 0.78  0.87
Malaysia   0.30 0.45 0.82  0.85
China   0.44 1.00 1.14  0.68
Morocco   0.26 0.24 0.27  0.52
Egypt   0.00 0.01 0.21  0.45
United Arab Emirates  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.42
Indonesia   0.00 0.00 0.04  0.39
Saudi Arabia  0.00 0.02 0.00  0.36
Belarus   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.34
Romania   0.09 0.17 0.25  0.30
Portugal   0.17 0.25 0.32  0.30
India   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.29
Venezuela, Boliv Rep of  0.00 0.26 0.15  0.27
Ukraine   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.24
Bulgaria   0.00 0.22 0.18  0.21
Sri Lanka    0.00 0.00 0.24  0.21
Bangladesh 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.20
New Zealand  0.15 0.15 0.14  0.19
Singapore   0.11 0.12 0.14  0.18
Philippines  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.18
Kazakhstan 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.17
Mauritania   0.00 0.00 0.02  0.14
France   0.35 0.35 0.34  0.14
Tunisia   0.03 0.06 0.05  0.11
Uruguay   0.07 0.01 0.01  0.09
Haiti   0.00 0.00 0.01  0.09
Macedonia,The Fmr Yug Rp  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.08
Tajikistan   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.08
Georgia   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.07
Nigeria   0.00 0.00 0.02  0.07
Turkmenistan 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.07
Source: FAOSTAT  51
Table A3. Refined Sugar Imports (million tons). 
  Average  
   1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1998-2000
    
World   4.83 8.10 11.07  14.48
    
Indonesia   0.12 0.47 0.27  1.18
Algeria   0.05 0.18 0.32  0.76
Nigeria   0.10 0.63 0.34  0.71
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.01 0.07 0.21  0.58
Egypt   0.01 0.45 0.46  0.48
Syrian Arab Republic  0.03 0.13 0.25  0.46
Israel   0.13 0.20 0.32  0.43
India   0.00 0.11 0.05  0.42
Yemen   0.08 0.12 0.23  0.39
Uzbekistan 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.34
Spain   0.13 0.01 0.20  0.34
Iraq   0.20 0.27 0.42  0.32
United Arab Emirates  0.01 0.06 0.23  0.32
Peru   0.00 0.07 0.14  0.31
Italy   0.31 0.21 0.20  0.31
Sri Lanka    0.28 0.23 0.09  0.29
Russian Federation  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.26
China, Hong Kong SAR  0.09 0.11 0.19  0.26
Pakistan   0.08 0.06 0.23  0.26
Saudi Arabia  0.08 0.27 0.41  0.22
Chile   0.03 0.14 0.11  0.21
Germany   0.14 0.11 0.22  0.21
Jordan   0.06 0.09 0.15  0.17
France   0.01 0.01 0.03  0.17
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.06 0.11 0.25  0.17
Somalia   0.00 0.02 0.00  0.17
Norway   0.16 0.17 0.16  0.17
Belgium   0.00 0.00 0.00  0.17
Tunisia   0.07 0.12 0.12  0.16
Singapore   0.04 0.01 0.06  0.14
Philippines 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.14
Switzerland 0.21 0.14 0.11  0.14
Macedonia,The Fmr Yug Rp  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.13
United Kingdom  0.16 0.19 0.14  0.12
China   0.00 0.01 0.12  0.12
Kazakhstan 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.12
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.11
Source: FAOSTAT   52
Table A4. Raw Sugar Exports (million tons). 
 Average  
   1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1998-2000
   
World 15.77 18.48 17.92  19.98
   
Brazil 1.16 1.71 0.82  5.65
Cuba 5.03 6.00 6.64  3.04
Australia 1.64 2.18 2.75  2.84
Thailand 0.08 0.91 2.06  1.89
Guatemala 0.06 0.19 0.47  1.25
South Africa  0.59 0.75 0.74  0.78
Colombia 0.14 0.23 0.28  0.64
Mauritius 0.55 0.56 0.59  0.52
Swaziland 0.15 0.28 0.42  0.50
Fiji   0.33 0.43 0.39  0.23
Guyana 0.33 0.26 0.15  0.22
El Salvador  0.06 0.08 0.05  0.22
Dominican Republic  0.79 0.88 0.39  0.20
Mexico 0.58 0.03 0.18  0.17
Jamaica 0.30 0.15 0.14  0.17
Philippines 1.22 1.24 0.24  0.16
Costa Rica  0.07 0.07 0.08  0.15
Zimbabwe 0.12 0.16 0.10  0.13
United Arab Emirates  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.10
Belize 0.06 0.10 0.09  0.09
Argentina 0.09 0.42 0.15  0.08
India 0.18 0.00 0.05  0.08
Sudan 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.07
Trinidad and Tobago  0.19 0.07 0.06  0.06
Zambia 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.06
Panama 0.03 0.12 0.05  0.06
Barbados 0.13 0.08 0.05  0.05
Poland 0.08 0.00 0.02  0.05
France 0.06 0.19 0.02  0.05
Nicaragua 0.07 0.08 0.10  0.04
Peru 0.38 0.11 0.07  0.04
Mozambique 0.19 0.08 0.02  0.04
Malawi 0.00 0.08 0.04  0.03
Moldova, Republic of  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02
China 0.47 0.32 0.02  0.02
Congo, Republic of  0.01 0.01 0.02  0.02
Saint Kitts and Nevis  0.03 0.03 0.02  0.02
Source: FAOSTAT   53
Table A5. Refined Sugar Exports (million tons). 
 Average 
 1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1998-2000
   
World 4.70 8.63 11.17  17.55
   
Brazil 0.00 0.65 0.60  3.34
France 0.80 2.24 2.55  2.83
Germany 0.21 0.94 1.27  1.40
Thailand 0.00 0.01 0.68  1.32
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.20 0.56 0.70  0.83
United Kingdom  0.21 0.06 0.30  0.68
Pakistan 0.04 0.00 0.02  0.54
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.49
South Africa  0.03 0.00 0.17  0.46
Turkey 0.07 0.00 0.02  0.43
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.40
China 0.13 0.18 0.44  0.40
Italy 0.02 0.15 0.12  0.36
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.05  0.35
Poland 0.15 0.04 0.26  0.34
Korea, Republic of  0.00 0.26 0.27  0.31
Denmark 0.05 0.22 0.26  0.29
Netherlands 0.08 0.24 1.13  0.27
Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.22
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.08  0.20
Austria 0.00 0.08 0.04  0.13
United Arab Emirates  0.00 0.01 0.13  0.13
Malaysia 0.00 0.03 0.21  0.13
Russian Federation  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.11
United States of America  0.00 0.52 0.46  0.10
Australia 0.03 0.02 0.00  0.09
Argentina 0.00 0.10 0.10  0.09
Portugal 0.00 0.03 0.00  0.09
Sudan 0.00 0.00 0.03  0.08
Zimbabwe 0.00 0.04 0.05  0.08
Sweden 0.02 0.03 0.05  0.08
Ukraine 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.07
Hungary 0.02 0.07 0.04  0.06
Ireland 0.02 0.05 0.05  0.06
Czech Republic  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.06
Nicaragua 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.05
India 0.07 0.31 0.03  0.04
Source: FAOSTAT   54
Table A6. Sugar Cane Production (million tons). 
 Average 
 1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1999-2001
  
World 576.3 768.3 1053.6  1259.9
   
Brazil 78.5 147.8 258.6  333.6
India 128.7 144.9 223.2  293.7
China 19.6 33.8 63.9  76.4
Thailand 5.4 17.7 37.0  51.0
Mexico 33.3 34.4 40.8  48.6
Pakistan 23.8 29.1 36.2  48.4
Australia 17.6 23.4 24.2  35.9
Cuba 60.5 69.3 80.8  35.1
Colombia 13.2 24.7 27.4  32.8
United States of America  21.4 24.5 26.6  32.1
Philippines 25.3 31.5 25.2  25.9
Indonesia 10.3 19.5 27.6  23.7
South Africa  14.6 17.3 18.9  23.0
Guatemala 2.7 5.6 9.3  16.6
Viet Nam  1.0 3.9 5.6  16.0
Argentina 10.2 15.6 15.9  15.9
Egypt 7.1 8.7 11.3  15.5
Venezuela, Boliv Rep of  4.8 4.8 7.1  8.6
Peru 7.9 6.4 6.8  7.5
Bangladesh 7.6 6.7 7.3  6.9
Ecuador 6.5 6.5 6.1  5.9
Myanmar 1.4 1.8 2.2  5.6
Sudan 0.8 1.6 4.1  5.1
Kenya 1.6 4.2 4.7  5.0
El Salvador  1.7 2.7 3.2  5.0
Mauritius 5.4 5.4 5.5  4.8
Dominican Republic  9.0 9.7 7.1  4.5
Zimbabwe 1.7 2.9 3.3  4.3
Swaziland 1.5 2.7 3.9  4.0
Honduras 1.3 2.8 2.8  3.9
Nicaragua 1.9 2.4 2.5  3.7
Costa Rica  2.0 2.6 2.6  3.7
Bolivia 1.3 3.1 3.2  3.7
Fiji Islands  2.6 3.8 3.8  3.5
Paraguay 1.2 1.6 2.7  3.4
Guyana 4.1 4.0 2.7  3.0
Source: FAOSTAT   55
Table A7. Sugar Beet Production (million tons). 
  Average     
   1969-71 1979-81 1989-91  1999-2001
    
World   222.9 272.8 302.6  246.7
    
France   18.5 30.3 29.9  30.3
United States of America  24.1 22.1 24.4  27.7
Germany   19.2 27.9 27.8  26.6
Turkey   4.5 8.9 13.5  16.5
Russian Federation  0.0 0.0 0.0  14.6
Ukraine   0.0 0.0 0.0  14.3
Poland   12.2 13.4 14.2  12.9
Italy   9.6 14.7 13.5  12.5
United Kingdom  6.8 7.5 7.9  9.3
China   2.2 5.3 13.4  9.2
Spain   5.6 6.7 7.1  7.7
Netherlands 4.9 6.2 7.8  6.8
Belgium-Luxembourg 4.7 6.6 6.5  5.9
Iran, Islamic Rep of  3.6 3.6 4.1  4.7
Japan   2.2 3.4 3.9  3.9
Denmark   2.0 3.1 3.4  3.3
Chile   1.4 0.9 2.4  3.1
Morocco   1.2 2.2 3.0  3.1
Czech Republic  0.0 0.0 0.0  3.0
Austria   1.8 2.6 2.6  2.8
Egypt   0.0 0.1 0.8  2.8
Greece   1.3 2.3 2.9  2.8
Sweden   1.6 2.3 2.4  2.7
Hungary   2.5 4.2 5.3  2.6
Yugoslavia, Fed Rep of  0.0 0.0 0.0  2.0
Ireland   1.0 1.3 1.4  1.8
Belarus   0.0 0.0 0.0  1.4
Moldova, Republic of  0.0 0.0 0.0  1.3
Syrian Arab Republic  0.2 0.5 0.5  1.2
Slovakia   0.0 0.0 0.0  1.2
Switzerland 0.4 0.8 0.9  1.2
Finland   0.4 0.8 1.1  1.1
Romania   3.6 5.6 4.9  0.9
Lithuania   0.0 0.0 0.0  0.9
Croatia   0.0 0.0 0.0  0.9
Canada   1.0 1.0 1.0  0.8
Portugal   0.1 0.0 0.0  0.5
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
 
 
 
  
 